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It is a major contention of this thesis that to argue, debate and
philosophize about choice and freedom of choice is one thing, but argu
ments as to the existence of free choice and claims to its exercise do
not mean much, unless within the framework of social and political life
the freedom is recognized and protected by some legal authority--in
this case, the United States Supreme Court.
This thesis is directed at two areas of political research. First
will be a survey and examination of current philosophic literature in
order to specify and describe the various models employed in contempor
ary conceptions of choice.
this thesis.

There are three such models discussed in

One may be termed the "action model" where choosing is

considered to be identical with the action taken.
choosing is acting.

In other words,

The second model may be termed the "action/decision

model" where it is argued that when what is chosen is an object, then
choosing is acting; but choosing is deciding in the case of choosing
to perform an action.

The third model is that in all cases, choosing

is deciding and not acting and that deciding is the result of delibera
tion.

This model may be termed the "decision" or "deliberative" model.
1

The second methodological element examines selected cases of the
Supreme Court in order to determine what protection, if any, is given
to freedom of choice, how it is justified, and in what areas of activity.
This chapter is broken down into six general categories:

voting, trials,

religion and school, education, pornography and marriage and procreation.
The categories are not all-inclusive of the scope of the Supreme Court's
decisions, but serve to break the cases discussed into units in which
the cases are generally related to each other and illustrates the sweep
of the Court's decisions with regard to choice.
The investigations of the philosophical discussions and the de
cisions of the Court bearing on freedom of choice are combined in the
final chapter is an endeavor to ascertain which of the identified phil
osophical models is employed by the Court in its decisions.

This will

be accomplished by examining the fashion in which the component parts
of choice— alternatives, actions, decision, and deliberation--are em
ployed and emphasized by the Court and the relationship of those state
ments to a particular model.

Also, there is to be an attempt to identify

the extent to which the models are currently used by the Court and the
consistency of decisions regarding choice.

Lastly, is a description

and analysis of how freedom of choice is protected and guaranteed by
the Court (if indeed it is).
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ABSTRACT
It is a major contention of this thesis that to argue, debate and
philosophize about choice and freedom of choice is one thing, but argu
ments as to the existence of free choice and claims to its exercise do
not mean much, unless within the framework of social and political life
the freedom is recognized and protected by some legal authority— in
this case, the United States Supreme Court.
This thesis is directed at two areas of political research. First
will be a survey and examination of current philosophic literature in
order to specify and describe the various models employed in contempor
ary conceptions of choice.
this thesis.

There are three such models discussed in

One may be termed the "action model" where choosing is

considered to be identical with the action taken.
ing is acting.

In other words, choos

The second model may be termed the "action/decision

model" where it is argued that when what is chosen is an object, then
choosing is acting; but choosing is deciding in the case of choosing
to perform an action.

The third model is that in all cases, choosing

is deciding and not acting and that deciding is the result of delibera
tion.

This model may be termed the "decision" or "deliberative" model.
The second methodological element examines selected cases of the

Supreme Court in order to determine what protection, if any, is given
to freedom of choice, how it is justified, and in what areas of activity
This chapter is broken down into six general categories:

voting, trials

religion and school, education, pornography and marriage and procreation
vi

The categories are not all-inclusive of the scope of the Supreme Court's
decisions, but serve to break the cases discussed into units in which
the cases are generally related to each other and illustrates the sweep
of the Court's decisions with regard to choice.
The investigations of the philosophical discussions and the deci
sions of the Court bearing on freedom of choice are combined in the
final chapter in an endeavor to ascertain which of the identified phil
osophical models is employed by the Court in its decisions.

This will

be accomplished by examining the fashion in which the component parts
of choice--alternatives, actions, decision, and deliberation--are em
ployed and emphasized by the Court and the relationship of those state
ments to a particular model.

Also there is to be an attempt to identify

the extent to which the models are currently used by the Court and the
consistency of decisions regarding choice.

Lastly, is a description

and analysis of how freedom of choice is protected and guaranteed by
the Court (if indeed it is).

vn

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
A controversy of sorts raged in the 1950's and 1960's.
troversy did not make headlines.

This con

It didn't appear on the evening news.

It was confined to the pages of some reputable scholarly journals.
During this period a number of scholars and authors contested the notion
of choice.
is made.

They asked what a choice was.

They questioned how a choice

They debated whether or not it is a freedom or whether or not

freedom is choice.
were right.

All came to some sort of conclusion.

All felt they

This thesis draws from these discussions in order to

further refine the discussions and place them in a legal perspective.
It is a major contention of this thesis that to argue, debate and phil
osophize about choice and freedom of choice is one thing, but argu
ments as to the existence of free choice and claims to its exercise
do not mean much, unless within the framework of social and political
life the freedom is recognized and protected by some legal authority-in this case, the United States Supreme Court.
Nigel Dower stated that one way to look at choice informally is
to say that, since,
(i)man has the capacity to envisage different possible states
of affairs, each of which excludes the others (ii) he can only
act in a particular concrete way, and (iii) choice is the means
by which he is constantly moving from many possibilities to the
actualization of one possibility. . . . As man has imagination,
he of necessity makes choices, but without imagination he would
never choose at al1.1
^ Nigel Dower, "An Ambiguity In the Concept of Choice," American
Philosophical Quarterly 8 (April 1971), p. 196.
1
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This conception is interesting but is over-simplified in the con
text of the present study.
political research.

This thesis is directed at two areas of

First will be a survey and examination of current

philosophic literature in order to specify and describe the various
models employed in contemporary conceptions of choice.
such models discussed in this thesis.

There are three

One may be termed the "action

model" where choosing is considered to be identical with the action
2
taken. In other words, choosing is acting.
The second model may be
termed the "action/decision model" where it is argued that when what
is chosen is an object, then choosing is acting, but choosing is de3
ciding in the case of choosing to perform an action.
The third model
is that in all cases, choosing is deciding and not acting and that de
ciding is the result of deliberation.^

This model may be termed the

"decision" of "deliberative" model.
With this brief glimpse, some common themes and elements emerge.
First and foremost are alternatives, a requirement of choice recognized
by all of the authors.

Alternatives are nothing other than the possible

courses of action available to an individual.

Without alternatives

there is nothing to choose and choice becomes moot.

Also included in

the foregoing description of models are action, decision, and delibera
tion.

Acting is merely doing something.

To decide is to make up one's

^J. L. Evans, "Choice," Philosophical Quarterly 5 (October 1955),
pp. 303-315; Richard Taylor, Action and Purpose (New York: Humanities
Press, 1973), pp. 72-77.
3
P. H. Nowell-Smith, "Choosing, Deciding, Doing," Analysis 36
(January 1958), pp. 63-69.
^W. D. Glasgow, "On Choosing," Analysis 35 (June 1957), pp. 135139; W. D. Glasgow, "The Concept of Choosing," Analysis 38 (January
1960), pp. 63-67.
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mind, to commit.
a given option.

To deliberate is to weigh the merits and attributes of
These terms are essential to any discussion and analy

sis of choice for they compose the elements of a choice. Some discount
the importance of one and emphasize another but these terms or com
ponents must be included and discussed in any treatment of choosing.
Included in the chapter discussing the philosophy of choice is a
section involving the determinants of choice.

Some authors maintain

psychological determination while others insist upon conscious, overt
acceptance and rejection of alternatives with regard to the final dis
pensation of a choice.
Finally in this chapter is a discussion of various authors' posi
tions regarding the relationship between choice, freedom of choice and
freedom.

Some authors claim that to be free is to be able to choose.

Others claim that freedom stems from the capacity to deliberate while
still others assert that freedom is nothing other than having alterna
tives.

The relations discussed and developed in this section will be

applied in the conclusions when the arguments of the Supreme Court are
applied to the various models of choice.
The second methodological element, which comprises Chapter III,
will seek to examine selected cases of the United States Supreme Court
using what is termed the "traditional" method of constitutional legal
research.

This traditional method has been described by Stephen L.

Wasby as concerned with the content of decisions of the Supreme Court
and their relation to the Constitution. Its concern is with doctrine
5
and impressions of various decisions.
This examination of the Court's
5

Stephen L. Wasby, Political Science, the Discipline and its
Dimensions (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970), pp. 456, 463.
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decisions will seek to determine what protection, if any, is given to
freedom of choice, how it is justified, and in what areas of activity.
This chapter is broken down into six general categories:

voting,

trials, religion and school, education, pornography, and marriage and
procreation.

These categories are not all-inclusive of the scope of

the Supreme Court's decisions, but serve to break the cases discussed
into units in which the cases are generally related to each other and
can illustrate the sweep of the Court's decisions with regard to choice.
The Court has made numerous statements with regard to choosing.
In the 1973 case of Miller v. California, the Court stated,
We do indeed base our society on certain assumptions that peo
ple have the capacity for free choice— those in politics,
religion and expression of ideas are explicitly protected
by the Constitution.6
It is with regard to statements such as this that the positions of
the Court will be assessed in the final chapter.

The investigations of

the philosophical discussions and the decisions of the Court bearing on
freedom of choice will be combined in an endeavor to ascertain which
of the identified philosophical models is employed by the Court in its
decisions.

This will be accomplished by examining the fashion in which

the component parts of choice--alternatives, actions, decision, and
deliberation--are employed and emphasized by the Court and the relation
ship of those statements to a particular model.

Also, there will be an

attempt to identify the extent to which the models are currently used
by the Court and the consistency of decisions regarding choice.

Lastly

will be a description and analysis of how freedom of choice is protected
and guaranteed by the Court (if indeed it is).

5

In short, this thesis takes the concept of choice and discusses
what various authors have said about it.

Decisions of the Supreme Court

are discussed in order to see if the Court has anything to say about
choice.

The beliefs of the various authors and the decisions of the

Court are then combined to see if there is such a thing as freedom of
choice.

If there is, then the statements of the Court and the arguments

of the philosophers will in combination provide some strong clues for
determining the nature and definition of freedom of choice in practice
rather than in theory.

CHAPTER II

THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHOICE
The Models of Choice
Philosophical writers have debated the issue of choice for some
years.

It is the purpose of this section to examine some of the posi

tions that have been taken concerning the nature of choice, for in
order to establish and promote a freedom of choice it is necessary to
understand what one is doing when one chooses.
Myles Brand^ and T. F. Devaney*
2 have traced choice through three
stages.

These stages are the concepts of choice which are subscribed

to in some form or other by the rest of the authors in this section and
will serve as the models for discussion.

The first and basic stage is

that choosing is identical with the action chosen so that to say "I
chose to play tennis instead of golf" means "I played tennis."

The

second conception of choice is to maintain that although choosing is an
action when what is chosen is an object, choosing is deciding in the
case of choosing to perform an action.

Thirdly, is that in all cases

choosing is deciding and not acting and is the result of deliberation.
The first definition of choice is that it is acting, or doing this
rather than that.

Actions are, according to Richard Taylor, "bodily

^Myles Brand, "Choosing and Doing," Ratio 12 (June 1970), p. 85.
2T. F. Devaney, "Choosing," Mind 73 (October 1964), p. 515.
3j. L. Evans, "Choice," Philosophical Quarterly 5 (October 1955),
p. 311.
6
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changes having internal events as their causes."

He further states of

choice:
Acting from choice is a perfectly common thing, and paradigm
cases are easily supplied. Think of a man, for instance,
walking through the cafeteria, who pauses before an array of
a great variety of juices, then reaches for a glass of orange
juice. Here certainly, is a perfect example of an act of
choice; namely the actual act, which consisted of taking one
thing from among others that were offered, and doing so under
circumstances in which those alternatives were, or were at
least believed to be, equally available. No one should seri
ously suggest that this man's choosing was something accom
plished entirely with his mind or his soul, and that the mo
tions of his hands and fingers were simply the observable ef
fects of that inner unobservable episode. There is no need
for any such episode at all.5
Here Taylor is referring to a simple act where alternatives are
present.

The fact of alternatives is construed as indicating a situa

tion where there is a choice to be made.
orange juice.
action.

The choice is in taking the

It is known that orange juice was chosen because of the

If no juice had been taken it could be stated that he did not

choose to have any juice, not because he did not act but because there
was the act of passing by the juice and having the alternative avail
able.
With this model, J. L. Evans indicated three situations where
choices occur:
1) Where we are confronted with a selection of things and we do
not know what we want
2) Where we do not know what to do and we consider alternative
courses of action.
3) Where we know what we ought to do but we find the action un
pleasant or difficult to perform.6
^Richard Taylor, Action and Purpose (New York:
1973), p. 72.
5Ibid., p. 76.
^Evans, "Choice," p. 313.

Humanities Press,

8

It is interesting to note that in using the term "consider alter
natives," Evans appears to vascillate somewhat towards the decision con
text of choice where deliberation is involved.

As indicated by his

statement that, "the word 'deliberation' as I have used it throughout
refers to the consideration of alternatives. . .
Not all actions are the results of choice.
for example, do not appear to result from choices.

Absentminded actions,
Brand stated that a

person chooses to perform an action only if he believes there are alter
natives open to him.^
tions.

This is also true with respect to habitual ac

An action is habitual only if the performer is not aware of

what he is doing at the time.

When a person drives or types or brushes

his teeth in the morning, he is not necessarily aware at those times of
what he is doing.

Since in performing an habitual action, the agent

holds no attentive beliefs about what he is doing, it is not the case
that he attentively believes that there are alternatives open to him.^
In this, the agent does not choose in any sense of the word, he merely
acts.
By way of stating what a choice is, Taylor said:
To act willfully is not in any case to perform or to undergo
some inner, unobservable twitch or convulsion of the soul in
the hope or expectation that this will somehow produce a de
sired twitch or jerk of the body, like the motion of a limb

^Ibid., p. 314.
^Brand, "Choosing and Doing," p. 88.
®Ibid., p. 88.
1°Ibid., p. 88.
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or the tongue. It is simply to act purposefully, with an end
in view, with some more or less clear knowledge of what one
is doing and why.
Brand sets his own prescription for choosing as an action in the
following formula:
For every person S, every action a_, and every time t^, .S chose
to perform a_ at t_ if there is an x such that:
(i) x was an action performed by J>;
(ii) S/s having performed x is identical with V s chosen
to perform a^
(iii) S_*s having performed x is identical with S_'s having
committed himself to perform a_;
(iv) at t, S believed that there were alternative actions
within his power; and

To Evans, the function of choice is to initiate action, and yet ac
tion need not follow immediately upon choice; there can be "a delayed
13
causal efficacy."
With regard to choice, Evans states that moralists have observed
that it is intimately connected with deliberation on the one hand and
with action on the other.

He states that it has been suggested that

choice "supervenes" on deliberation and at other times that choice might
be identified with the last part of the deliberative process.

As to

choice and action, he states that the main reason for the introduction
of choice by moralists is that it should initiate action, an operation
which deliberation by itself cannot perform because it is purely theo
retical in character.

He further maintains that the imporance of the

concept of choice is, ". . . further enhanced by the doctrine that

Taylor, Action and Purpose, p. 77.
12
13

Brand, "Choosing and Doing," p. 90.
Evans, "Choice," p. 305.
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anything worthy of the name of action must have been chosen and consci
ously chosen at that.'4 ^
By way of further definition, Evans states of choice that it is
. an activity which intervenes between deliberation and action, or
between intention and action. . . . "

15

In choice, however, the notion

of alternatives seems always to be present, and to choose may be para
phrased as to select by preference from a group of alternatives.^

This

notion of alternatives and preference was also exhibited by Brand in
his "diagram" of choice.

Evans, however, comes full circle in his dis

cussion of choice by denying that choice is an intermediary between de
liberation on alternatives and action.

He states that, ". . . it is

often maintained that . . . the choosing is different from and separate
from the action performed, and sometimes it is the preparatory act of
choosing which is the proper subject of praise and blame.

I am maintain

ing that the verb 'to choose' never denotes a separate act."^
It is sometimes asserted that whereas it is always possible to
find out what a person's actions were, we cannot in the same
way find out what his choices were. This is however, only a
half truth. It is correct to say that merely by observing a
person's behavior we cannot know whether the act performed
was done after consideration of alternatives or not. But so
long as we know what a person did and we know also that he
deliberated before acting, we know what his choice w a s J ^
What choice boils down to then is observable, quantifiable actions
It is impossible to dig into someone's head to ascertain whether alter
natives and preferences were weighed, but the action remains.
positivistic sense lies choice.
141bid., pp., 304-305.
15Ibid., P- 305.
161b id ., P- 306.

In this

By observing the visible, physical
171bid. , p. 312.
18

Ibid., p. 313.
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manifestations of choice--action--it is possible to say that a choice was
made and that the action is the same as the choice.
This leads Evans to the culmination of his discussion.

Sounding

like an idealist or utopian, he invokes Aristotle by advocating that in
the development of a charitable disposition or character, it is neces
sary to deliberate and choose from available alternatives.

"But once

the disposition is acquired, deliberation and choice can surely be dis
pensed with and we can act, for example, in a spontaneously charitable
way."

19

So, at this point, deliberation and choice become unnecessary

and the individual need only act and is assured that his actions are
charitable or virtuous.

The problem with the whole discussion of choice,

according to Evans, is that moralists have often confused the process
of acquiring such dispositions with the state of actually acquiring them.
Choice and deliberation have a great deal to do with the former but
nothing to do with the latter.^
With this, there appears to be a problem.

In the process of be

coming virtuous, it is necessary to deliberate and choose.

With virtue

it is not necessary, for people will always act in a virtuous fashion.
This is precisely the problem:

that there is only action.

There is no

choice involved because there are no alternatives, a point which both
Evans and Brand emphasized.

In this concept, if my neighbor's house

were on fire I would automatically act to help him put out the fire,
but what if a burglar were robbing my house at the same time?

This is

precisely the problem, where one is faced with two situations at once,1
0
2
9
19Ibid., p. 315.
20
Ibid., p. 315.
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both requiring action.

It is virtuous and charitable to protect your

property and family and equally virtuous and charitable to assist your
neighbor.
tion.

Even the virtuous man would have to choose in this situa

Evans would say that he would only act and that his act would be

virtuous and charitable.

Maybe so, but in so doing he defeats himself

for he is not left with choice as action or doing this rather than that.
Rather, he is left only with action and must fall back on the conception
of action as the visible result of deliberation and choice as his ac
tion theory of choosing.
In this Evans, Brand, and Taylor are left with choice coming some
where between deliberation and action.

It is through action that choice

is manifested and the results of deliberation become evident.

Choice

becomes equated with action for the reason that the particular action
indicates both that a choice was made and what that choice was.

This

does not appear to be inconsistent with their reasoning or with the
definition that choice is action (or doing-this-rather-than-that).
The second conception of choice is that choosing is an action,
as far as choosing objects is concerned, but in the case of choosing
actions, choosing is deciding.

21

This theory is attributed to P. H.

Nowell-Smith who in attempting to clarify the issues of choosing made
the above differentiation.

He stated, however, that "the fundamental

sense of 'choose' is much nearer to 'do' and that the sense in which
it is akin to 'decide' is secondary."

To choose is defined as "to

po
take something by preference out of all that are available, to select.,,c-3
2
*
pi

Devaney, "Choosing," p. 515.

22

P. S. Nowel1-Smith, "Choosing, Deciding, Doing," Analysis 36
(January 1958), pp. 63-64.
23

Ibid., p. 64.
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The notion of alternatives and selecting among them are present in this
definition.

Interestingly, deliberation is not included for "choosing

does not always involve deliberation or even having reasons for one's
choice, apart from having a simple preference.
To decide, on the other hand:
. . . is to determine a question, controversy or cause. . . .
From this, by an easy transition, it comes to mean 'resolve,
make up one's mind,' which is the sense that concerns us. The
transition is easy because in each case a controversy of some
kind is settled. . . . From all this it appears that the root
idea in choosing is the physical act of taking something, that
in deciding, the symbolic or conventional act of putting an
end to a dispute.^
Nowell-Smith has at least laid the ground work for his position.
His distinctions and final analysis have more the appearance of hair
splitting than developing a concept of choice.

It seems as if Nowell-

Smith maintains that decision is a sub-set or part of choice.

He states:

Deliberating, deciding, intending--to say nothing of advising
and commanding--cluster round doing; they are intelligible
only in connection with doing, if only for the obvious reason
that deliberating is deliberating what to do, and so on. . . .
From this fundamental sense of 'choose' it is not difficult
to pass in different directions to the umbrella sense in
which it covers more than a physical of metaphorical takingthis-rather-than-that and to the cold-storage sense in which
a decision to take this rather than that is substituted for
an actual taking. . . . In any case it cannot be fundamental
since the idea of deciding to do this rather than that in
the future is parasitic on the idea of doing this rather than
that now. We could not go window-shopping if,we did not know
what it was to actually buy something. . . . °
Here Nowell-Smith is attempting to make the distinction between
deciding and doing or choice.
Ibid., p. 64.
25Ibid., P- 64.
26Ibid., P- 67.

His conception becomes slightly clearer

14

with his discussion of the intermediary function of choice.

To some

choosing is an intermediary between deliberation and doing, identified
through the doing (see Evans and Brand).

Through this Nowell-Smith

makes or attempts to make the final distinction between choosing and
deciding.

He reiterates his stance that prior deliberation is not es

sential for choice and consequently choice need not be an intermediary
even if choice occurs before acting, because nothing preceded the
choosing.
When there is deliberation, the upshot may be either (a) an
actual taking, (b) a conventional or symbolic act, such as
pointing or saying 'I'll have that one,1 or (c) a private de
cision to take this rather than that (thing or course). These
three form a logical order in which each is dependent on the
one before, and it is the last which provides the paradigm
base for deciding. In this last case we might well speak of
deciding as an intermediary between deliberating and doing,
for we deliberate first, then decide, then do.2/
So, although deciding may be considered an intermediary proceed
ing doing or acting, choosing is not.
For, while deciding to do, in the paradigm sense, and doing
are always two things, even where doing follows hard on the
heels of deciding, choosing and doing are not always two
things. Choosing is not just doing, nor is it something
other than doing and causally connected to it, it is doing
thi s-rather-than-that.28
The third model involved in this discussion is that, in all cases,
choosing is the same as deciding, and is in fact the upshot of a pro
cess of deliberation.
T. F. Devaney gives five conditions which he believed necessary to
be fulfilled for something to be called a choice.2
8
7
27Ibid., p. 68.
28Ibid., p. 68.
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(1) There must be alternative courses open to the agent.
(2) The agent must know that there are alternatives, and that
the embracing of one involves the rejection of the others.
(3) One must believe that the alternatives are possible to
attain.
(4) There is a condition of aim or requirement.
(5) The alternative chosen is always considered that which
suits us best.29
Condition four, is the most abstract and least clear.

Devaney at

tempted to clarify the point by stating that,
The particular choice he makes can be seen as a fulfillment of
a prior requirement, and it is this which guides his choice.
For example, if it is my wish to arrive at a particular des
tination as quickly as possible, my choice of transportation
would be guided by this desire, and the choice I make would
be comprehensible to others if it were explained in these
terms.- The requirement which my final selection satisfies
acts as a principle of choice, and it is by reference to it
that I choose the one alternative rather than the other.*
303
1
As for the fifth condition, Devaney distinguishes it from the fourth
condition, stating that it is:
. . . understandable if we always select what we consider to
be the best alternative to realize some end we have in mind.
It is this condition which differentiates choosing from
merely seeking; for I cannot be said to choose, if I am
merely looking for an object answering a certain description
among a lot of other things. . . . In choosing, I am guided
by an end in view, and what is chosen is what I think will
best bring about this end.3^
With these preliminaries taken care of, Devaney discusses the
other models of choice, interspersing his own thinking and conception of
choice, forcing the reader to dig fin order to ascertain his theory.
Devaney, "Choosing," pp. 515-517.
30Ibid., p. 516.
31 Ibid., p. 517.
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With reference to the idea of choosing as both doing and deciding (Nowell Smith), Devaney disagrees and elaborates:
This of course follows from my view that choice is to be under
stood in terms of purpose or end. The end of an envisaged ac
tion, or one that is actually being performed for that matter,
can never be an object per se. Actions do not end in objects
but in states of affairs, or more actions. Briefly then, it
would seem that if it is not possible to choose objects as
such, the view under consideration must be amended, i.e., all
choosing is choosing actions or states of affairs, and choice
consists in deciding to perform these actions, or bring about
these states of affairs.32
At this point, Devaney says that he is close to the third point of
choosing as deciding in a context of deliberation.

He gets closer but

still does not hit the nail on the head when he states that
. . . choice involves conscious acceptance and rejection, and
no simple physical movement is equivalent to this. Nor could
a mere movement take the place of the agent's judging that
this was the best alternative in the circumstances.33
This argument almost falls back on the previously discussed notion
of choice in a context of alternatives involving a necessary amount of
deliberation and that the selection of one alternative over another is
the essence of choosing and may be considered a decision to take or do
this-rather-than-that.

T4

Devaney concludes his statements regarding the elements of choice
by writing;
To sum up, choosing consists in making up one's mind with re
gard to a particular object, action or state of affairs, in a
context of alternatives, and the particular choice is made in
the light of best fulfilling some aim or requirement the
agent has in mind--in the sense that if the agent 'chose' some
thing, but claimed that no requirement or aim was fulfilled,
we would conclude that he was either talking nonsense, or con
cealing his aim.*
3
Ibid., p. 520.

^Devaney, "Choosing," p. 524.

33Ibid. , p. 522.
^ S e e Evans, "Choice," pp. 304, 306, 314.
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Here, Devaney alludes to three things.
ing that it consists in making up one's mind.

First, he states of choos
Secondly, he throws in

the context of alternatives, which brings the decision into a choice
context and lastly he reiterates his position of fulfilling some aim or
requirement.

From all this it might be surmised that Devaney should be

included in that group holding that choice is a decision and the product
of a process of deliberation.
W. D. Glasgow becomes involved in discussing this decision-delibera
tion model by taking on Evans and Nowell-Smith in a linguistic duel,
while at the same time expounding his own perspective on the concept of
choice.^

While debating with Nowell-Smith, he prefaces his theory by

writing that,
In order . . . for us to say that an act was an act of choos
ing, there must be awareness of alternatives as alternatives,
together with a considering of these alternatives. That is,
there must be at least minimal deliberation.37
Glasgow also states that (1) decision emphasizes commitment and
(2) choosing emphasizes the consideration of alternatives.
So while the decision is also a choice in this case, choice
involves decision in every case, as being a husband involves
being a man. This brings out the essential relationship of
choice to decision. Choice must indeed involve decision,
for deliberation, which we have shown to be essential to
choice, if it leads to action, must have a resolution.38
Choosing, then, is on the same logical level as deciding; both are com
mitments to act, and both involve fundamentally the same type of mental
operation.^93
*
8
7
6
36W. D. Glasgow, "On Choosing," Analysis 35 (June 1957), p. 135,
Vi. D. Glasgow, "The Concept of Choosing," Analysis 38 (January 1960),
p. 63.
37

Glasgow, "The Concept of Choosing," p. 64.

38Ibid., p. 65.
■^Glasgow, "On Choosing," p. 137.
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Stress is laid on the fact that in choice there is always an aware
ness of alternative courses of action. But if deliberating on al
ternatives is involved in choice, surely there must be at some
stage a commitment, that is a decision to take one course of ac
tion rather than another. The commitment is a commitment to a
particular imperative . . . which is an answer to a particular
question. . . . Since commitment is the essence of choosing,
choosing is not identical with the actual doing this-ratherthan-that: the relationship between the two is rather one of
quasi-implication.40
Glasgow's definition is thus seen to be that to choose is to decide
to take this-rather-than-that.4^

As he stated in his final reply to

Evans, "choosing and deciding are on the same logical level.
emphasizes deliberation about alternatives:

But choosing

deciding stresses the fac

tor of commitment (although both commitment and alternatives are present
in either case)."

Glasgow reinforced and elaborated on this belief

in his parting shots at Nowell-Smith:
I am willing to admit that choosing and doing are logically con
nected, but not that the root idea in choosing is that of
physical taking. The two philosophically important senses of
the word are connected as follows. Common to both senses are
the factors of deliberation about alternatives and decision
(to action of some sort). In the cold-storage sense, where ac
tion is in the future, and where the agent is prevented from
acting by some external cause or death or because he simply
changed his mind, we can still say that a choice has been
made. This suggests that what is fundamental to choosing are
the factors common to both senses, i.e.. deliberation about
alternatives and decision (to action).^3
Simply, then, Glasgow is saying that choices occur when one is con
fronted with alternatives, deliberates upon them, decides on one (makes4
3
2
*
0

40Ibid., p. 137.
^Glasgow, "The Concept of Choosing," p. 66.
42
43

Glasgow, "On Choosing," p. 137.
Glasgow, "The Concept of Choosing," p. 66.
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a commitment) and finally acts.

The action is the culmination of this

process and although not necessarily essential for a choice to take
place is certainly an integral part of the process.
The Determinants of Choice
After having dealt with the three models of choice, attention can
now be turned briefly to Rem B. Edwards who dealt with the conceptions
of choice developed by Sir David Ross and C. A. Campbell.^
Ross stated that an impulsive action follows from a desire or the
stronger of two or more competing desires and a deliberate action is the
result of a choice intervening between desire and action.

45

Ross is

attempting to make a distinction here as well as attempting to pinpoint
under what circumstances a choice occurs.

He said,

. . . to desire is not to choose . . . to desire an end more
than its alternatives is not to choose it. A man may in fact
be desiring an end more than any alternative, but he cannot
be said to choose it until he performs a perfectly specific
new kind of mental act. . . . This act may eqully well be
called an act of decision. Any decision is in fact . . . a
choice of one thing in preference to all others.46
A closer reading of Ross reveals that he is speaking of choosing
actions, which sounds like the first model of choice equating choosing
with action.

But, Ross really subscribes to the choosing a

decision

model by invoking the concept of decision as an intermediary between
the desire and the action.

"What we really choose or decide is to

seek a certain end, i.e., to take whatever steps are expedient to the*
6
5
4
^Rene B. Edwards, "Is Choice Determined by the Strongest Motive,"
American Philosophical Quarterly 4 (January 1967), pp. 72-78; W. D. Ross,
Foundations of Ethics (London: Oxford University Press, 1951); C. A.
Campbell, On Selfhood and Godhood (New York: MacMillan Co., 1957).
45
46

Ross, Foundations of Ethics, pp. 192-193.
Ibid., p. 194.
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attaining of the end.

To choose is to choose to take means to an end."^

The only part left out is how one goes about ascertaining what end is
to be pursued.

Presumably, one could sort out the alternatives avail

able, the salient issues connected to each (desires, etc.), weigh them
in balance and decide or choose.

On this Ross is unclear, but there

must be a way because chosen ends rarely appear out of nowhere.
C. A. Campbell dealt with next by Edwards, writes of moral decisions,
desires, character, duty and conflict in a most interesting fashion.

His

position is expressed by the following passage:
There is in every man at every stage of his life a developing
but relatively stable systematic complex of emotive and cona
tive dispositions which we call his 'character.' It is this
inner system, this character, which determines what desires will
emerge in response to a given situation, what will be the rela
tive strengths of these desires, and what, in consequence will
be his strongest desire. A man's strongest desire at any mo
ment may in fact be regarded as a function of his character in
relation to the given situation. But if that is so, moral
decision cannot be experienced by the agent as flowing from
his character. For it is of the very essence of the moral
decision as experienced that it is a decision whether or not
to combat his strongest desire, and hence to oppose his formed
character; and presumably strongest desire or formed character
cannot find expression in the decision whether or not to
fight against itself. The self-activity of moral decision,
then, as experienced, differs very significantly from the
self-activity of ordinary choices in virtue of the fact that
while in both cases it is the self that is active, in the
former case it is not the self merely qua formed character
that acts, but the self as somehow transcending its own formed
character.48
To Campbell, the program in choice is encountered when desire on
the part of the "agent" comes face to face with duty of some sort.
this situation a conflict develops which must be resolved.4
*
7

47Ibid., p. 196.
^Campbell, On Selfhood and Godhood, p. 150.
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Now in all those practical choices--and they comprise perhaps
99 percent of the choices in most men's lives--in which there
is no felt conflict of duty with desire, it seems clear that
the determinant of choice can only be the agents strongest
desire.49
So, according to Campbell, it is the strongest desire which determines
the overwhelming majority of choices.

But, according to him, it is an

individual's own formed character which determines what the strongest
desire will be and hence almost all (99%) choices are determined by
the "agent's" character.
The problem area in Campbell's discussion lies in the one percent
of choices which do not flow from one's character--as was put by Camp
bell, those situations where there is a conflict between desire and
duty.^®

These situations and choices he terms as creative.

The difficulty we have in conceiving an act as at once the self's
act and yet not flowing from the self's character is at bottom
the difficulty ..... of understanding anything that is genuinely
creative. If an act is creative, then nothing can determine it
save the agent's doing of it.51
In this situation (the conflict between duty and desire),
The agent is aware that if he lets his purely desiring nature
have its v/ay it is not X, his duty, but Y, the object of his
strongest desire, that he will choose. But since the moral
decision to be taken is between rising to duty or yielding to
desire, it is plain that he believes that he can rise to duty,
despite the contrary pressure of desire. He can rise to duty,
however . . . only by exerting an effort: an effort quite
distinct in kind from physical effort or intellectual effort
. . . . This unique kind of effort may appropriately be named
'moral' effort; for its whole function is to enable us to
resist the importunings of desire in obedience to duty.524
2
*
0
5
9
49Ibid., p. 151.
50Ibid., p. 152.
^ I b i d . , p. 153.
52Ibid. , p. 154.
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Edwards disagrees with both Ross and Campbell.

He takes strongest

and most particular exception to Campbell by maintaining that choosing
itself is the rare element (reflecting on Campbell's 99% statement).
He states that,
We simply act most of the time directly on the basis of our
motives--without making choices at all. We have to make choices
only in cases of serious conflict among motives or sets of mo
tives, and such conflict is the exception rather than the
rule.53
He is saying, then, that it is not 99% of our choices which are deter
mined by character, desires or strongest motives, but rather 99% of our
actions which are determined in this fashion without making choices at

Edwards finishes his criticism of Campbell by stating that,
. . . against Campbell, I would hold that we never choose
against our strongest desire. The function of choosing is
that of supplementing the strength of desires which would not
be strong enough alone to predominate over competitors.55
At one point Edwards comes close to Campbell when he writes of
choosing in a conflicting situation, although the conflict he deals with
is between desires instead of duty and character/desire.

In the same

section Edwards responds to Ross and his position on deliberate and
impulsive action (see note 47).

Ross writes:

Introspection reveals that when we know very clearly that we
most strongly want a certain end, we do not have to make a
choice in the matter at all. We simply pursue that end. It
is only in cases where desires are strongly conflicting that
we ever have to make a choice among contemplated alternatives,
and the fact that in such cases desires have to be supplemented
by choices indicates that no particular desire or set of de
sires is clearly strong enough until after the choice is made.
We seldom have to make choices, for we usually know well what*
4
5
rO

Edwards, "Is Choice Determined by the Strongest Motive," p. 77.

54Ibid., pp. 77-78.
55Ibid., p. 78.
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we want and pursue the wanted end without having to choose it
at all. Choices are made only in cases of conflict, and the
job of choice is to supplement a weak desire or set of desires
and make it strongest over its competitors. When we choose,
we attend closely to the alternative with which we identify
ourselves and not to its competitors. This concentrated at
tention upon a certain end causes our desire for that end to
increase in intensity and lack of attention to the competing
ends causes the desires for them to decline sharply and al
most immediately in strength and often to pass almost completly out of existence. Thus, some motive preceded choosing,
but choosing preceded that moment when the motive which brings
about the act becomes strongest. . . . It is not choosing which
is determined by the strongest motive, as determinists have
traditionally argued. Rather it is choosing which decides
which motive is to become strongest. Determinism of the
'strongest motive or set of motives causes choice1 variety
would make choosing superfluous, but in fact, choosing defi
nitely does have a job to do when it occurs.56
As opposed to the previous authors, Edwards, Ross and Campbell
concerned themselves with the manner in which a choice is made rather
than the mechanics, elements and definition of a choice.

These three

differ somewhat in their approach and conceptualization of the problem,
but all contain similar elements such as desire and some form of de
liberation; Ross with deliberate acts, Campbell with the conflict of
desire and duty, and Edwards with competing desires.

The above mentioned

notion of deliberation has common areas among the three and this sort
of activity will take increasing importance in the coming discussion.
These three are not the only authors who address themselves to
the determinants of choice.

Kenneth Gallagher weaves a descriptive

web of the concept of choice and the role of the individual in it.
Using an example of a man being offered a bribe who must choose to ac
cept it or choose honesty, Gallagher asserts that the determinist
would maintain that the agent involved could do what he pleases but
56

Ibid., p. 77.
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can't choose what please him.

By choosing honesty, he chooses something

that is an ingrained part of his experience.

Therefore, there was no

choice, only a determining of the stronger factor of his personality,
honesty or profit.575
9
8
The determinist here interjects that he cannot choose his choice;
but he can do what he pleases, but he cannot choose what pleases
him. That is, the sway exercised by the motive of honesty is a
factor in his experience independently of what he makes of it.5^
This position is quite similar to the notion of strongest desire
promoted by Ross, character as described by Campbell or the strongest
motive of Edwards.
agrees.

With this deterministic perspective, Gallagher dis

He states that since the decision is the product of what

pleases the agent the most then honesty becomes the strongest desire.
This explains free choice from below--as the resultant of in
stinctive or capricious energies issuing in a last 'pleasing'
. . . . This way of stating the process of free decision
does not really seem to be a correct transcription of what
occurs; there is no decision as such included: finally
pleasing is not deciding, and therefore a genuine psycho
logical component has been omitted.59
With his objections noted, Gallagher launches his discussion of
choosing.

He refers to a mystical 'I' often and it becomes central to

his discussion.

By way of preface and answering his objections to de-

terminists, Gallagher states:
Could not the answer be that I am only able to say 'I' in the
consciousness of what I lamely call 'freedom'? That is, my
transcending my own motives is included in the comprehension
of myself as 'I' and therefore perhaps I cannot even consistenly
raise the question of whether I am free. . . . So the rational
being only says 'I' in distinguishing himself from the motives
grasped as other than his act of deciding.60
57Kenneth T. Gallagher, "On Choosing the Choose," Mind 73 (Octo
ber 1969), p. 480.
58Ibid., p. 481.
59Ibid., pp. 481-482.
60Ibid., pp. 485-486.
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But, what of this mysterious 'I'?

As stated, it is employed as a

means of separating oneself from motives and even choices and actions.
Gallagher pointed out that children employ this 'I' in order to separate
themselves from their toys and trees and even their siblings.

Conse

quently, this 'I* may be understood as that by which we transcend our
formed character or that by which we assert our individuality and con
duct ourselves in our own unique and sometimes unpredictable ways.
This is, as was put by Gallagher, the essence of the revelation of being
or "nonconceptualizable truth.
By way of elaboration and further clarification, Gallagher wrote
that the agent,
. . . could not say 'do I decide or do the motives?' unless he
made the distinction between the two; and he could not make
the distinction between the two unless he experientially dis
tinguished them as two; and could not experience them as two
unless he experienced the motives as non-decisive.
Simply, then, he is saying that motives are found but choices are placed
At this point, Gallagher mentioned some of the aspects of his 'I'
and introduced his statements relating to being and truths of an unconceptualizable nature.

Perhaps one of the most important keys to an

understanding of the things about which he is speaking comes when he
wrote that, "freedom is not a quality belonging to an object, whose
presence can be detected by proper examination.
ment 'I am free' simply means 'I am I'."

61 Ibid., p. 495.
62Ibid., p. 486.
63

Ibid., p. 490.
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Perhaps . . . the state

He goes on to state,6
2
1
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. . . where do we then
be an I is to exist in
to exist thus is to be
ing of freedom is that
open to being.64

stand? To be free is to be an 'I1; to
the realm of non-conceptualizable truth;
open to being. Consequently, the mean
it is that mode of existence which lies

This is in strict reference to the 'I' and its relation to free
dom.

But what of freedom of choice?

choice?

How does this relate to free

Gallagher does not feel that free choice is either the meaning

of freedom or its primary manifestation.
Primary
or not, when a man says 'I am free' does
henot in
tend 'Icould have
chosen otherwise,1 and should we not deal
with the expression rather than skirting it? Since the self
is part of a necessitated world, then the assertion of free
dom must also be an assertion about the self's role in that
world. . . . The statement 'I could have chosen otherwise1
is comprehensible not as a statement about the I, nor as a
report of an introspective datum. It is a retrospective
description of my actions: and it simply asserts that to
the extent that my experience includes an 'I' no inference
from an earlier to a later set of actions can be a necessary
one. . . . What is introspectively present to me is simply
that there are motives, and that I must choose, and that my
choosing is other than the motives. I am not worried about
choosing otherwise, but only about choosing; and if I later
look back and say 'I could have chosen otherwise,' what I
am principally saying is that I did in fact choose. I am
also sure that because I did choose, the inference from my
past to my future actions has to pass through the inconceptualizable 'I'.
Gallagher has now completed the circle.

He began by talking about

choice, shifted to a discussion of motives, went from there to his unconceptualizable 'I,' from 'I' to freedom and finally back to choice.
With final reference to choice it might be reiterated that Gallagher did
not believe free choice to be either the meaning of freedom or its pri
mary manifestation.

To choose, however, is an assertion of freedom being6
5
4

64Ibid., p. 492.
65Ibid., p. 493.
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that choice emanates from the self which is the expression of the 'I.1
To Gallagher:
. . . the meaning of freedom is 'I'; the meaning of 'I' is
found in creative experience; the meaning of creative experi
ence is the revelation of being, or nonconceptualizable
truth. Therefore the meaning of freedom is nonconceptualiz
able truth.66
With this concept of choosing and freedom introduced, attention
must be turned to other authors who have written and dealt with the re
lation between the two.
almost diametrically.

Some approximate Gallagher and others differ
Some authors have written of choice and related

choosing to freedom while others have appeared to write of freedom
including choice as an essential element.

With this in mind, attention

is turned to these authors.
Choice and Freedom of Choice
First to be dealt with in this group is J. G. Clapp, who concerned
r

himself with identifying the conditions of freedom.

7

He considered

these conditions to be, first, that an act must be voluntary.

The act

must also be possible and the full existence of freedom requires
ro

choice.

Clapp based his arguments on Aristotle who wrote that choice

is "the deliberate desire of things in our power, for when we have de
cided as a result of deliberation, we desire in accordance with our
deliberation.6
9
*
66Ibid., p. 495.
6^j. G. Clapp, "On Freedom," The Journal of Philosophy 60 (Febru
ary 1943), pp. 85-100.
^Ibid., pp. 86-89.
69

Aristotle, The Works of Aristotle, trans. and ed. W. D. Ross,
12 vols., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925), vol. 9: Ethica Nicomachea,
p.1113a 1.10-11.
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These conditions are analogous to the elements of choice dis
cussed earlier in this chapter.

Consequently, Clapp appears to be stat

ing that since the conditions of freedom are virtually the same as the
elements of choice, then choice must be the same as freedom.

Support

is lent to this argument where Clapp includes alternatives and delibera
tion in his discussion.

"Alternatives in any human action obviously

are not unlimited, and to the number of alternatives which exist, our
freedom extends and no further, for they set the limits of our choices."'7
Clapp apparently sets more importance on deliberation as his dis
cussion of it is more detailed and becomes the pervasive theme of his
work.

He states that "our classic traditions of freedom and democracy

have supposed that men are capable of ’deliberate desire1 or ’choice.’
Of deliberation he states,
To deliberate at all and to act according to that delibera
tion is to be free, but not as free as the man who deliber
ates well. Practical wisdom is a ’reasoned and true state
of capacity to act with regard to human goods.’ The man of
practical wisdom is freer than another, because he chooses
what another would, if he were not ignorant of some point
or another, or if he had a stronger character.72
Deliberation is essential to freedom, since we attain our
goals by means of it; without it we are not the full agents
of our acts, and secure our ends only by chance. . . . We
deliberate about means but not about an end in view. How
ever, we may and do deliberate about particular ends but
not about uni versa!s; for the virtues are universals and
standards to which particular ends and acts are perceived
either to conform or not. The virtues are not relevant
except to a good life, because they are the discovered
conditions of human excellence. . . . Excellence in de
liberation, then is true reasoning about particular things.
^Clapp, "On Freedom," pp. 88-89.
Ibid., p. 95.
72ibid., pp. 94-95, subquote from Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, p.
1140b 1.20.
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Unless men possess the power of true reasoning there can be
no freedom, since they would not be capable of discerning,
nor able to calculate the means of attaining, their own or
others' good.73
With this discussion of deliberation and true reasoning, Clapp
asserts that freedom belongs primarily to men, for men are the only
creatures capable of choice (or at least the type of choice with its
deliberations as described by Clapp).^

Clapp concludes by saying that,

Since freedom resides in the man and not in the circumstances,
it follows that we say that freedom is the power to select
one of a number of alternatives. . . . In the fullest sense
the term 'freedom' seems reserved to indicate choice which is
deliberate desire of things in our power, and particularly
when there is excellence in this deliberation. It is in
this sense that we mean that the man of practical wisdom is
most truly free.75
Clapp has indicated, therefore, that freedom exists, first, because
alternatives exist and, second, that some higher stamp of approval is af
fixed by the use of deliberation and practical reasoning.

R. C. Skinner

is also an advocate of this freedom through alternatives theory, al
though he uses what he terms "freedom of action" to describe the free
doms inherent in his concept.75

This concept is somewhat analogous to

the "doing-this-rather-than-that" definition of P. H. Nowell-Smith
described earlier in this chapter.
Skinner believed that the most important conditions for making a
choice is the possession of freedom of action and that a person has
this freedom of action if, "in a particular situation, there are two or
more alternative courses of action which he is able to follow."77
73Ibid., pp. 96-97.

In

77ibid., p. 464

741bid. , P- 96.
75Ibid., P- 100.
76r . c . Skinner, "Freedom of Choice," Mind 72 (October 1965), pp.
463-480.
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addition to alternatives, the second most important thing for making a
choice is (as also stated by Clapp) the notion that, "one must know or
at least firmly believe, that one is able to follow either of them."

70

The proof of this freedom appears to lie in the simple statement
that in a given situation one "could have done otherwise."

As was put

by Skinner,
We are all often in situations where, whatever we choose to do,
we could equally well have chosen to do something different,
since choosing to behave differently depends only on being able
to behave differently: it is a question only of freedom of ac
tion, together with a knowledge of, or a firm belief in, that
freedom.™
The above relates, essentially, to the will of the actor and his
on
belief in freedom of action. Irving Thalberg in a corollary article
wrote that,
It seems that the conditions necessary for freedom of the will
are a limited subset of the optimum conditions for exercising
our abilities and rights to act and for exploiting our op
portunities to perform various deeds. . . . I would maintain
that agents and their actions take primacy over the wills and
decisions of agents within any cogent theory of human free
dom.1
Thalberg sums up his arguments along this vein by stating that, "unless
we assume that a person has freedom of action, questions about his
will are otiose."82
This freedom of will may be equated with freedom of choice.

With

regard to this freedom, Skinner is more dramatic in his concluding statements.

He maintains that,7
1
0
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78Ibid., p. 465.
791bid., p. 467.
80

Irving Thalberg, "Freedom of Action and Freedom of Will," Journal
of Philosophy 61 (July 1964), pp. 405-415.
81 Ibid. , p. 414.
Ibid., p. 415.
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The only belief that is essential for the existence of free
dom of choice is the firm, and correct, belief that in a par
ticular situation, there are two or more alternative courses
that one is able to follow, and such a belief is never part
of, but is rather a precondition of, any reason for doing
something or other, and therefore of any rationalization by a
person about what he does.83
Essentially, these authors are indicating that it is one thing
to weigh the alternatives in a deliberative fashion and choose but
quite another to implement that choice.

This appears to negate the ac

tion model of choice by tacitly recognizing that choosing and doing are
two separate and distinct occurrences.

It is possible to choose and not

act or to be denied the opportunity to act by some form of restraint
(denial of freedom of action).

In the case of the deliberative process

it may be possible to act without choosing at all, even though alterna
tives are present, whether by some sort of knee-jerk reaction or in
stinctive taking.
This concept of free action is somewhat related to the notion of
autonomy. Douglas Carmichael

84

wrote that autonomy is the power of a

part to act with some degree of independence of the whole.

Autonomy

does not refer specifically to freedom of choice but simply to the gen
eral power of independent a c t i o n . E s s e n t i a l l y , an individual pos
sessing freedom of action has the power, authority or even autonomy to
act in a fashion that is independent of the whole.
OO
Skinner, "Freedom of Choice," p. 480.
OA

Douglas Carmichael, "Autonomy and Order," Journal of Phil
osophy 55 (July 1958), pp. 648-655,
85

Ibid., p. 654.
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Apparently then, to choose is one thing; to act freely another,
but to choose and act freely together can be construed as autonomy
and may possibly be a higher order of freedom than the two separately.
Fitting into this scenario, Carmichael stated that, "free will would
be the particular type of autonomy associated with the choices and ef
forts of certain animals, including man.

It would be autonomy of the

self in regard to its acts of will and will alone."

nr

Clapp, Carmichael, and Skinner have discussed choosing in several
different contexts of freedom ranging from freedom associated with the
deliberation of choosing to freedom of action stemming from alternatives
and hinting at freedom in the context of choosing and autonomy.

Addi

tionally, several authors have participated in what can be termed a
general discussion of freedom based on choosing which helps in substan
tiating the claim of freedom of choice and its relation to freedom in
a social context.
Leszek Kolakowski

in writing on freedom noted that in contem

porary conceptions of the term,
. . . all models assumed that conflict of interest consti
tuted an irremovable part of social life and that therefore
freedom could be defined only as a principle of individual
choice within the limits of the restrictions imposed by law
and the social organization.88
Kolakowski is recognizing the existence of this freedom.

He continues

and eventually attempts to define the singular concept of freedom by way
of freedom of choice.
86Ibid., p. 654.
^Leszek Kolakowski, "Freedom and Freedoms," Dissent 21 (Summer
1974) pp. 374-379.
88Ibid., pp. 375-376.
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Obviously the right to individual freedom of choice is doomed
if the individual lacks the opportunity to make use of his
right. But it does not follow that he should therefore be
deprived of the freedom of choice.
To Kolakowski, an example of this is that "free choice of employment is
meaningless in a society with mass unemployment, but it does not follow
that true freedom consists in attaching man to specific places of em
ployment, i.e., in a return to slavery."^9
concludes

in this context, Kolakowski

by maintaining "if the term 'formal freedom' means the area

of decisions left to the individual by the social organization and the
law, then it means simply 'freedom,' there is no other freedom."

90

With this preliminary diagnosis of freedom of choice as freedom,
attention is brought to two final authors who view this concept in a
similar way but who use different approaches in reaching their conclu
sions.

Douglas Browning9^ attempts to find and establish the meaning

and experience of a "feeling of freedom."

This feeling of freedom mani

fests itself in the guise of choice and to Browning is that which allows
us to be free.
There are three criteria established by Browning for proof that
the feeling at which he arrives is the appropriate one.

First, the feel

ing is a feeling of freedom of choice or a feeling which claims in some
fashion to certify the freedom of that choosing.
feeling is found only at the point of choice.
free now.
89

Secondly, the relevant

It is a feeling of being

Lastly, is that the feeling must be primitive.

It must appear8
1
0
9

ibid., p. 378.

901bid. , p. 379.
91 Douglas Browning, "The Feeling of Freedom," Review of Metaphysics
18 (Summer 1964), pp. 123-146.

34

as a claim of freedom in the original and the claim itself must be the
original claim.

92

In his discussion, Browning identifies and for various reasons re
jects eleven different feelings.

These include the feeling of being

unrestrained; feeling of spontaneity; feeling of confidence in the belief
that we are free to choose between alternatives; moral feelings; the
experience of self causation; feeling of behavioral efficacy; feelings
of power, autonomy and independence; feeling of effort; feeling of
freedom from the demands of desire; feeling of an open future; and
the point of view of the agent.

His discussion eventually boils down

to what he calls the experience of choice itself.

This becomes the

final candidate for identification with the feeling of freedom.
As for the three criteria, Browning describes the experience of
choice as existing at the point of choice, "only and always" is suf
ficiently primitive in nature, and is a claim to freedom of choice.94
With regard to its primitive nature Browning states that,
It is not the chosen alternative or object which claims free
dom of choice but the experience of choice itself and the
structure which that experience cannot help but have.95
The claim of freedom of choice was determined by ascertaining that,
To select alternative x is to take x rather than y;, otherwise
it is not selecting but taking the open path. . . . The ex
perience of choice then presents a claim of being a true
selecting among alternatives which are given as genuine pos
sibilities to be selected among. What more could a claim of
freely selecting involve than this claim of truly selecting
among true possibilities?96
92Ibid., P- 125.
93Ibid., pp.. 126- 139.
94Ibid., pp.. 143- 144.
95Ibi d., P- 143.
96Ibid. , P- 144.
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The feeling is identified and defended.
The long sought feeling of freedom is no other than the ex
perience of the act of choice itself as it is performed, as
it must be performed, within the practical stance. Moreover,
it is the experience of choice which privides the evidence
for the attendant belief in one's freedom.9?
So, once again, as with the previous authors, freedom becomes equated
with freedom of choice and its attendant alternatives, deliberations,
and actions.

Of choice, Browning stated that,

We experience choice not as something we are conscious of,
but as something we consciously do. . . . A t the time we make
the choice we are fully engaged consciously in the discrimi
nation of alternatives, ends motives, environmental means,
and hinderances; we are very seldom attentive to the struc
tures of our own choosing.9B
The last of these philosophers is Richard N. Bronaugh who attributes freedom to the absence of an excuse.

99

Freedom of choice plays

an essential role in his conception of holding an individual morally
responsible for his acts.

"Before a man is held morally responsible

for an act, it must be decided whether he was a free agent in respect
of the act.

Freedom is a necessary condition for the justifiable

holding of a man morally responsible."^

Freedom is thus brought on

the scene quite early as a "necessary condition."

However, freedom of

choice is mentioned, almost in the next breath, as a further condition
for holding one morally responsible.

Equating the two, Bronaugh states

that an "unfree" man cannot be legitimately held responsible for his
97Ibid., p. 145.
98Ibid., p. 145.
99

Richard N. Bronaugh, "Freedom as the Absence of an Excuse,"
Ethics 74 (April 1954), pp. 161-173.
100 Ibid., p. 161.
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wrong a c t . ^

Therefore, if one must be free and must exercise freedom

of choice to be held morally responsible, then freedom of choice and
freedom must be one and the same since an "unfree" man is one who cannot
be held morally responsible for a wrong act and at the point of the act
he was presumably unable to exercise free choice.
It is just as commonly believed that whether there is freedom
of choice is to be decided on the basis of some morally neutral
fact in the condition and circumstances of the agent such as a
mental disorder, or a threat leveled at him as he acted or
the existence of causal relationships determining what he
does.102
It is here that excuses are introduced.

Bronaugh continues to ex

plain them in detail but in addition to the two mentioned above, insanity
and duress, excuses include provocation, mistake and accident.

How

ever, it is observed that acts committed under these circumstances "are
not always excused; therefore, though any excuse will probably be an
instance of the five discussed, any instance of the five is not automatically an excuse."

im

°

This then is the essential element of Bronaugh's position.
dom to him is the absence of an excuse.
to choose freely.

Free

To be free one must be able

One is not considered free in his choices if there

is the excuse of insanity, duress, mistake, accident or provocation.
The meaning, then, is that in the absence of these conditions one is
considered to have freely chosen and may be held accountable or respon
sible for his acts.

101

Ibid., p. 162.

102Ibid. , p. 162.
103

Ibid., p. 170.
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This chapter has dealt with the nature of choice, what it is and
its structure.

Three models were described; the action model, the de

cision model, and the deliberative/decision model.

It may be true as

in the first model that choice is not discernable unless an action en
sues, but this is not necessarily what a choice is.

A choice is a com

bination of elements of which action is one, but a choice also includes
the elements of alternatives (whcih must be within the power of the
agent to do). Choice also entails, hopefully, at least some sort of a
deliberative process--a commitment, expression of preference, or decision--and lastly the action chosen.

This is a choice.

It has been

variously described, analyzed and used in conjunction with other con
cepts, but it remains choice.
There are those who insist that choosing is fundamental to any
conception of freedom whether alone or in conjunction with such vari
ables as freedom of action, or moral responsibility, or a nebulous
feeling.

It is possible to advocate this until one's writing hand

is cramped and withered, but the existence of freedom of choice is not
necessarily real or recognized (although possibly practiced) until
some authority says so.

With this in mind, the following chapter in

vestigates some of the decisions by the United States Supreme Court in
order to clarify the legal understanding of free choice.

CHAPTER III

THE COURT AND CHOICE
The Supreme Court has made numerous statements regarding choice
and its correlative facets.

There have been few, if any, specific cases

related to the right of freedom of vhoice but the Court has, by a hit
and miss process, provided some excellent statements and background of
legalistic support for justifying, in a Constitutional sense, this free
dom.

The cases to be discussed have been divided into six general cate

gories.

They are not necessarily all inclusive but are representative

of the reasoning process and are the cases most often cited by the Court
Attention will be given to not only the particular cases and judg
ments but to the reasoning and comments by jurists, in both majority
and dissenting roles, relative to choice.

One of the most graphic state

ments of free choice was made by William 0. Douglas in a dissenting
O
opinion in Public Utilities Commission v. Poliak.
In this case, he
wrote of choice stating that the,
right of privacy should include the right to pick and choose
from competing entertainments, competing propaganda, competing
political philosophies. If people are let alone in those
choices, the right of privacy will pay dividends in character
and integrity. The strength of our system is in the dignity,
the resourcefulness, and the independence of our people. Our
confidence is in their ability as individuals to make the
wisest choice.3
1Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S., 152 & 168 (1973).
2343 U.S. 451 (1952).
3
Vern Countryman, Douglas of the Supreme Court (Greenwood Press,
1955), p. 320.
38
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It is important to note that Douglas is here relating choosing to
a "right of privacy."

As this discussion continues, this right of pri

vacy will become increasingly important to the existence and analysis
of choice, although never so well put as by Douglas in his dissent.

As

Justice Brandeis stated in his now famous and oft quoted dissent:
The makers of the Constitution sought to protect Americans in
their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensa
tions. They conferred as against the Government, the right to
be let alone--the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every
unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of
the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a
violation of the Fourth Amendment.4
So, according to Douglas and Brandeis, there is, or ought to be, a
right of choice and to be left alone to those choices with respect to
the right of privacy.
alone.

Privacy is here defined as the right to be left

The various cases to be discussed will hopefully clarify and

further illustrate the right to free choice.
Voting
In the 1964 case of Carrington v. Rash,^ the petitioner to the
Supreme Court was a member of the Armed Forces stationed in Texas where
he intended to make his permanent home.

He was denied the right to vote

because of a provision in the Texas Constitution permitting a serviceman
to vote only in the county where he resided at the time of his entry
into the military.

The Supreme Court held that the state can impose

reasonable residence requirements for voting but it cannot deny the ballot
to a bona fide resident merely because he is a member of the armed forces.^
^Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 478 (1928).
5380 U.S. 89 (1964).
6Ibid., 90.
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In addition, the court stated that "the right . . .

to choose that this

court has been so zealous to protect, means, at the least, that States
may not casually deprive a class of individuals of the vote because of
some remote administrative benefit to the State.
This right of choice with regard to voting was strongly identified
g
in U.S. v. Classic which was cited in Carrington and used as a basis for
argument.

The Classic case involved the court's allowing the conviction

to stand of a Louisiana election officer who perpetrated fraud in a primary election in which a member of Congress was nominated.

9

This decision

brought primaries under the protection of federal election laws.

The

major importance of the primary election in Louisiana was not to nominate
a candidate, but essentially to elect him to Congress due to the strength
of the particular party.^
Interference with the right to vote . . . for the choice of
Democratic candidate for Congress, is thus, as a matter of law
and in fact, an interference with the effective choice of
voters at the only stage of the electoral procedure where
their choice is of significance, since it is at the only stage
when such interference could have any practical effect on the
ultimate result, the choice of the Congressman to represent
the district. The primary in Louisiana is an integral part
of the procedure for the popular choice of Congressman.
The right of qualified voters to vote . . . and to have their
ballots counted is thus the right to participate in that
choice.''
Obviously the right to vote is the right to choose one's own candi
date.

This is a fundamental concept of choice.
7

The importance is the

Ibid., 96.

8313 U.S. 299 (1940).
^Conrad E. Smith, The Constitution of the United States, 10th ed.
(New York, Barnes, Noble, 1975), p. 71.
1°313 U.S. 313 (1940).
11 Ibid., 314.
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Constitutional justification for this form of choosing, for voting is
the most readily recognizable area of choice within a political or govern
mental framework.

It is a form of choosing where ideally, there is de

liberation concerning the alternatives available and the legal right to
express a preference by way of the vote for the choice which is the re
sult of the deliberation.
Trials
There are two Supreme Court cases to be discussed with regard to
choosing and trials.
McCann

12

The first, a 1942 case of Adams v. U.S. ex rel

which involves the trial of McCann who was originally indicted

for mail fraud.

During the proceedings against him, McCann insisted

on conducting his own defense and waived, even demanded, that there be
no jury and that he be tried by the judge alone.
appealed.

He was convicted and

At his appeal, he obtained counsel who claimed to the Court

of Appeals that one who is without counsel does not have the power to
surrender his right to a jury trial. With this the Court of Appeals
13
agreed.
The Supreme Court disagreed saying,
An accused, in the exercise of a free and intelligent choice,
and with the considered approval of the court, may waive trial
by jury, and so likewise may he competently and intelligently
waive his Constitutional right to assistance of counsel.'4
It is important to note that the court stipulated a right to choose
to waive both a trial by jury and counsel, "where this action is taken
with his express, intelligent consent, where the Government also consents,
and where such action is approved by the responsible judgment of the1
3
2
12317 U.S. 269 (1942).
131bid., 270.
141bid., 275.
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trial court."

With this the Court appears to make assurances that the

individual involved is aware of his alternatives, deliberates and makes an
informed choice.

With regard to these factors the Court concluded its

opinion by stating,
. . . if the record before us does not show an intelligent and
competent waiver of the right to the assistance of counsel by
a defendant who demanded again and again that the judge try him,
and who in his persistance of such a choice knew what he was
about, it would be difficult to conceive of a set of circum
stances in which there was such a free choice by a self-deter
mining individual^
The court has upheld the original claim of free choice as being done
knowingly, if not prudently, and has also asserted the fact that McCann
was in fact to be held responsible for his choice and its ramifications.
Similarly, in the case of Faretta v. California, ^ the Court upheld
its earlier reasoning stating, "the right to defend is given directly
to the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense
fails.In

this case, Faretta was accused of grand theft and re

quested to serve as his own counsel.

The judge denied him his request

and appointed a public defender to represent him.

The judge ruled that

Faretta had not made an intelligent and knowing waiver of his right to
the assistance of counsel and also ruled that he had no constitutional
18
right to conduct his own defense.
As with the McCann case, the Supreme Court asserted the right
of individual free choice with regard to counsel.
15Ibid., 281.
16422 U.S. 806 (1975).
171bid., 819.
181bid., 806-7, 809-10.

The court stated that,1
8
7
6
5
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Whatever else may be said of those who wrote the Bill of Rights,
surely there can be no doubt that they understood the inesti
mable worth of free choice. . . . Freedom of choice is not a
stranger to the constitutional design of procedural protections
for a defendant in a criminal proceeding.
Again, in a limited sense, the court asserted the right of the in
dividual to freedom of choice.

This freedom was expanded in subsequent

cases which will now be dealt with.
Religion and School
In the case of School District of Abbington Township, Pennsylvania
v. Schempp

20

the Supreme Court ruled that recitation of the Lord s

Prayer or reading from the Bible during opening school exercises is a vio
lation of the First Amendment.

21

In this case the Court ruled,

Because of the prohibition of the First Amendment against the
enactment by Congress of any law 'respecting an establishment
of religion,' which is made applicable to the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment, no state law or school board may re
quire that passages from the Bible be read or that the Lord's
Prayer be recited in the public schools of a State at the be
ginning of each school day--even if the individual students
may be excused from attending or participating in such exer
cises upon written request of their parents.22
The Court maintained that a state neutrality must be imposed with
respect to religion.

A reason for neutrality by the Court regarding

religion,
. . . is found in the Free Exercise Clause (of the First Amend
ment), which recognizes the value of religious training, teach
ing and observance and, more particularly, the right of every
person to freely choose his own course . . . free of any com
pulsion from the state.231
3
*
0
2
9
191bid., 834.
20374 U.S. 203 (1962).
^Smith, Constitution of U.S., 110.
22374 U.S. 203 (1962).
23Ibid., 222.
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So, in this situation, as compared to the previous discussion of trials
and voting, the Court is maintaining a right of religious choice as de
lineated by the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

This is a

glimmering of the right to free choice, for if one has the right to
fully choose religion in accordance with the First Amendment, then the
same right ought to apply to the other freedoms included in that amend
ment.
The case of Pierce v. The Society of Sisters
and closely relates to it.

24

preceded this case

The Pierce case involved a challenge of an

Oregon law which required parents to send their children to public schools
until they had completed the eighth grade.

This law effectively prevent-

ed the attendance of accredited parochial and other private schools.
The Supreme Court stated that the,
Society's bill alleges that the enactment conflicts with the
right of parents to choose schools where their children will
receive appropriate mental and religious training, the right
of the child to influence the parents' choice of a school, the
right of the schools and teachers therein to engage in a use
ful business or profession and is accordingly repugnant to the
Constitution and void.26
With this the Court was in agreement, stating that,
The Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education
of children under their control. . . . The fundamental theory
of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose
excludes any general power of the State to standardize its
children by forcing them to accept instruction from public
teachers only.272
7
6
*
4
24268 U.S. 510 (1924).
2^Smith, Constitution of U.S., 109.
26268 U.S. 532.
27

Ibid., 534.
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In the Abbington Township case, Justice Brennan made statements
that not only applied to that case but retroactively to the Pierce case
as we 11.

He wrote,

Attendance at the public school has never been compulsory;
parents remain morally and constitutionally free to choose the
academic environment in which they wish their children to be
educated. . . . The relationship of the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment to the public school system is pre
eminently that of reserving such a choice to the individual
parent. . . . The choice which is thus preserved is between a
public secular education with its uniquely democratic values,
and some form of private or sectarian education, which offers
values of its own. In my judgment the First Amendment forbids
the State to inhibit that freedom of choice by diminishing the
attractiveness of either alternative. . . . The choice between
these very different forms of education is one— very much
like the choice of whether or not to worship— which our Con
stitution leaves to the individual parent. . . . The lesson
of history— drawn more from the experience of other countries
than from our own— is that a free system of public education
forfeits its unique contribution to the growth of democratic
citizenship when that choice ceases to be freely available to
each parent.^8
These two cases have firmly established that the Supreme Court did
indeed recognize the right to freedom of choice.

Not only has choice

been guaranteed but attention has been paid to some of its elements,
such as alternatives and deliberation (deliberation was hinted at in the
statement, "inhibit . . .

by diminishing the attractiveness of either

alternative").
Another case, West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette

29

re

lated to an appeal by the Jehovah Witnesses challenging the Board of
Education's action making it compulsory for children in the public schools
to salute the flag and pledge allegiance.

The penalty for not saluting

the flag was expulsion until the student complied.
28
374 U.S. 242 (1962).
29319 U.S. 624 (1942).

The Jehovah's2
9
8
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Witnesses claimed that the salute to the flag constituted the worship of
a graven image.3*3 The Court stated that the,
Freedom asserted by the appellees (Jehovah's Witnesses) does not
bring them into collision with rights asserted by any other in
dividual. . . . Nor is there any question in this case that their
behavior is peaceable and orderly. The sole conflict is between
authority and the rights of the individual.3l
Without a doubt the Court considered these people different.

The

impact of the Court's judgment in this case is that there is a freedom
to differ and this freedom "is not limited to things that do not matter
much.

That would be a mere shadow of a freedom.

The test of its sub

stance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the
existing order.1,33
not necessarily.

This right to differ can be included in choice but

One can choose to be different or one can be different

through habit or cantankerousness.
Wisconsin v, Yoder,33 a case between the school system of Wisconsin
and members of the Amish, projected a protection very similar to those
included in Pierce. Yoder, of the Amish way of life, was convicted of
violating Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law by refusing to
send his children to school after completion of the eighth grade.

34

The essence of the Court's decision was that Yoder's claim to
withholding his children from school was protected by the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment and by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Court argued,
30.,.,
Ibid. , 628-629.
31 Ibid. , 630.
32Ibid. , 642.
33406 U.S. 205 (1971).
34
J Ibid. , 205.
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. . . Secondary schooling, by exposing Amish children to worldly
influences in terms of attitudes, goals, and values contrary to
beliefs, and by substantially interfering with the religious de
velopment of the Amish child and his integration into the way
of life of the Amish faith community at the crucial adolescent
stage of development, contravenes the basic religious tenets
and practice of the Amish faith, both as to the parent and the
chi Id.35
The Court is indicating that the children in question do not have
to attend further high school.

The right to make this determination,

however, is not the child's but belongs to the parent.

This is much the

same as Pierce in which the parent was deemed to have the right to direct
the upbringing of the child.

As asserted by the Court,

It is the parents who are subject to prosecution here for failing
to cause their children to attend school, and it is their right
of free exercise, not that of their children, that must determine
Wisconsin's power to impose criminal penalties on the parent.36
What is asserted, then, is a right for the parent to choose, on re
ligious grounds, the direction of the raising of children.

The Court

stated that this is a way of life based upon religious grounds which the
parents direct upon their children much the same as confirmation classes
in other faiths at the same approximate age.

The Court presented a right

to be different and stated that, "a way of life that is odd or even
erratic but interferes with no rights or interests of others is not to
be condemned because it is different."

37

In this particular case, the Court did not overtly specify a right
to choice but the implications seem clear.

The parent has the alternative

of public education or the Amish tradition, the state of Wisconsin claimed*
5
3
351bid., 218.
35Ibid., 230-231.
37Ibid., 224.
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only the alternative of public education.

To some extent the parent

claims only the alternative of the Amish way.

The Supreme Court in sup

porting Yoder's claim, presents both alternatives by asserting that the
Amish may withdraw their children from school after the eighth grade.
That they may do this does not necessitate the action for nothing (short
of their religious belief) precludes them from allowing their children
to complete high school.

Therefore, this may be construed as a freedom

of choice issue of the Court in its decision has allowed for alternative
courses of action.
These cases have provided a glimpse of the right to choice as ap
plied to religion and its relation to education.

The Court has establish

ed some ground for the justification of choice with these cases and the
application of these cases is more universal than their specific rela
tion to education.

The next category also deals with education although

in a broader sense.
Education
The case of Green v. County Board of New Kent County
ation of Brown v. Topeka.

OO

was a continu

In the Green case the Supreme Court disallowed

a school board plan to give parents freedom of choice to send their chil
dren to a formerly all-white school or a formerly all-black school, be
cause the plan shifted responsibility for complying with Brown v. Topeka
from the school board to the parents.

39

The freedom of choice set by

the school board permitted students to choose annually between the3
*
8
3839 U.S. 430 (1969).
"^Smith, Constitution of U.S., 128.
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schools.

During this plan's first three years of operation no white stu

dent chose the formerly all black school, one-hundred-fifteen black stu
dents enrolled in the formerly all-white school.

Fully 85% of the black

students stayed in their old school.4®
In this case, the Court did not object to a freedom of choice plan
but took exception because the freedom of choice plan was not adopted
until eleven years after the Brown case and was a plan allowing dejure
segregation but retaining de facto segregation.4^

The Court held that

the burden,
. . . is on the school board to provide a plan that promises
realistically to work now and a plan that at this late date
fails to provide meaningful assurance of prompt and effective
disestablishment of a dual system is intolerable. . . . Where
a freedom of choice plan offers real promise of achieving a
unitary, nonracial system there might be no objection to allow
ing it to prove itself in operation, but where there are reason
ably available other ways, such as zoning, promising speedier
and more effective conversion to a unitary school system,
freedom of choice is not acceptable.^2
This is not as big a blow to freedom of choice as it might appear.
In striking down freedom of choice, it was upheld.

The court indicated

that the freedom of choice desegregation plan was used in a selfish and
non-productive manner but that in the proper circumstances could be ef
fective and judicious.
The case of Meyer v. Nebraska

AO

dealt with a challenge of a Neb

raska statute which prohibited and teaching of a foreign language in ele
mentary schools (below eighth grade) and also prohibited the teaching of4
2
1
0
40

391 U.S. 430 (1969).

41 Ibid., 438-439.
42Ibid., 430-431.
43262 U.S. 390 (1922).
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any subject in a language other than English.444
5 The Court based its
ruling on a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and stated that,
Without doubt, it (the Fourteenth Amendment) denotes not merely
freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the indi
vidual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations
of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home
and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates
of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges
long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pur
suit of happiness by free men.^5
The court upheld the right to teach and learn a foreign language
and related it to other general rights which are similar in some respects
to the right to choose or influence a choice of where to go to school
(Pierce v. Society), or the types of religious activities in which one
may engage (W. Va. Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette).

Essentially, the Court

listed a group of rights in the Meyer case, all of which can be chosen
or in fact are chosen.
Pornography
It is with respect to pornography that the Supreme Court has had
the greatest dichotomy of opinion concerning both free choice and the
nature of obscenity.

The Court has used various definitions of porn

ography in attempting to nail down a solution to the problem.

None of

these definitions, however, have ever proved to be completely satisfac
tory in alleviating the problem of pornography.
The case of Roth v. U.S. is one such example.4^

In this case the

question was whether the federal obscenity statute violated the provision
of the First Amendment which states that Congress shall make no law
44Smith, Constitution of U.S., 123.
45262 U.S. 399 (1922).
46354 U.S. 476 (1956).
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abridging the freedom of speech or press.

Roth had been convicted of

mailing obscene circulars and advertisements in a violation of federal
obscenity statutes.474
0 The Supreme Court upheld his conviction saying
5
9
8
that,
The protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of pol
itical and social changes desired by the people. . . .All
ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance
. . . have the full protection of the guarantees, unless ex
cludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more
important interests. But implicit in the history of the First
Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without
redeeming social importance.48
In this decision the Court defined obscenity and set a standard
for judging it.

Obscene material is, "material which deals with sex in

a manner appealing to prurient interest.1,49

The standard for judging

obscenity is, "whether to the average person, applying contemporary com
munity standards, the dominant theme of the material, taken as a whole,
appeals to prurient interests.
Of crucial importance in this case, and other obscenity cases, are
the dissenting opinions.

Justice Douglas attacked not the definition

of obscenity but its proscription.

Douglas took exception to the de

cision and advocated non-control except under the test of "clear and
present danger" and stated,
The absence of dependable information on the effect of obscene
literature on human conduct should make us wary. It should
put us on the side of protecting society's interest in litera
ture, except and unless it can be said that the particular
publication has an impact on action that the government can
control.51
471bid., 482.
48
Ibid., 484.
49Ibid., 487.
50Ibid., 489.
51 Ibid., 511.
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By way of argument against prohibition and of support for indi
vidual discretion in obtaining these materials, Douglas said that, "the
First Amendment, its prohibition in terms absolute, was designed to pre
clude courts as well as legislatures from weighing the values of speech
against silence.
position.

The First Amendment puts free speech in the preferred

„52

Hence, it is apparent that the Court has placed restrictions on
choice in the matter of pornography, but that their reasoning is far from
unanimous.

A further case related to pornography in which the members
CO
of the Court were in much stronger agreement, is Stanley v. Georgia. 0
This case is important for more than its stand on pornography.

It also

affirmed and gave the impact of law to the famous Brandies dissent in
Olmstead v. U.S.

The Stanley case dealt with pornographic films found

in the bedroom of

the plaintiff during a lawful search ofbookmaking

activities.^

way of upholding the Brandeis dissent, the Court stated

By

that, "fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited cir
cumstances, from unwanted governmental intrustions into one's privacy."^
The Court also stated that the appellant (Stanley) is.asserting:
. . . [T]he right to read or observe what he pleases--the right
to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy
of his own home. He is asserting the right to be free from
state inquiry
into the contents of his library. . . . If the
First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no
business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what
books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole con
stitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving govern
ment the power to control men's minds.5°
52 Ibid., 514.
53

394 U.S. 557 (1968).

54Ibid., 557.
55Ibid., 564.

56 Ibid., 565.
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Essentially, then, this case drew a distinction.

It made no state

ment concerning the definition of pornography or the social implications
involved.

In Roth v. U.$., the court decided on an issue involving

pornography and the mail.
one's home.

In Stanley the issue was with the privacy of

Consequently, the Court drew a line‘saying that in the pri

vacy of one's own home one may view or read what one chooses.

This

codified the right of privacy and will be shown to have taken on increas
ing importance in the next category of cases.

Through this subsequent

discussion, the Roth case's relation to choice will become more evident.
The case of Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaten
sues related to pornography and privacy.
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raised similar is

In this case the most important

consideration was the definition of a public place.

The Court relied on

Civil Rights Statutes for its definition of theaters as places of public
accomodation and concluded from this definition that the movies in ques
tion were being publically displayed and violated obscenity statutes.88
The opinion of the court was delivered by Justice Berger who
stated,
Our prior decisions recognizing a right to privacy guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment included only personal rights that
can be deemed fundamental or implicit in the conceot of order
ed liberty . . . . This privacy right encompasses and protects
personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, mother
hood, procreation and child rearing. . . . Nothing, however, in
this Court's decisions intimates that there is any fundamental
privacy right implicit in the concept of ordered liberty to
watch obscene movies in places of public accomodation.^ 5
9
8
7

57413 U.S. 49 (1973).
58Ibid., 64-65.
591bid., 65-66.
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The dissent of Justice Brennan to this decision is quite important.
Rather than taking exception to Berger's arguments concerning the Four
teenth Amendment, Brennan concentrated on the First Amendment, and made
two specific points with regard to protection against the imposition of
pornography, stating that,
In short, while I cannot say that the interests of the State-apart from the question of juveniles and unconsenting adults-are trivial or non-existant, I am compelled to conclude that
those interests cannot justify the substantial damage to con
stitutional rights and to the Nation's judicial machinery that
inevitably results from state efforts to bar the distribution
of unprotected material to consenting adults. . . . I would
hold, therefore, that at least in the absence of distribution
to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults,
the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State and
Federal Governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexu
ally oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly ob
scene contents. Nothing in this approach precludes those
governments from taking action to serve what may be strong
and legitimate interests through regulation of the manner of
distribution of sexually oriented material.
Brennan advocated in this dissent that as long as there is not ex
posure to juveniles or non-consenting adults, then government should leave
pornography alone.

These two exceptions can be construed as a compelling

state interest in which case the state may intervene.

Brennan stated with

regard to exposure to juveniles and non-consenting adults that there are,
"all the characteristics of a physical assault and it constitutes an in
vasion of his p r i v a c y . W i t h regard to this, attention is turned to
co
Miller v. California,
a case involving (like Roth) the mailing of ad
vertisements for pornography to non-consenting adults.
This particular case involved the application of a State's crimi
nal obscenity statute to a specific situation where "sexually explicit"6
1
0
60

Ibid., 112-113.

61 Ibid., 106-107.
62413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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materials were mailed to unwilling recipients who had not indicated any
desire to receive such materials.

This situation is closely analogous

to the unconsenting adult and assault argument used by Brennan in the
Paris Theater case.

The Court upheld Miller's conviction and further

attempted to define obscenity, saying that,
. . . Under the holdings announced today, no one will be sub
ject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene ma
terials unless these materials depict or describe patently of
fensive hard core sexual conduct specifically defined by the
regulating state law. . . .
In this genre the Court gave examples of what a state statute could regu
late.

This included patently offensive representations or descriptions

of ultimate sexual acts (normal or perverted, actual or simulated) and
patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excre
tory functions, and lewd exhibitions of the genitals.^
With this definition, the court held Miller's advertisements to
be pornographic and hence upheld his conviction for using the mails to
disseminate obscene materials.

The real controversy in this case, how

ever, dealt with the definition of pornography and the question (once
again) of its place within the framework of the First Amendment.

To

this end the Court stated that, "to equate the free and robust exchange
of ideas and political debate with commercial exploitation of obscene
material demeans the grand conception of the First Amendment and its high
purposes in the historic struggle for freedom."
Amendment protection.
63Ibid., 18.
64Ibid., 27.
651bid., 25.
661bid., 34.
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So much for First

The majority opinion was generous to admit that,6
5
4
3

56
"one can concede that the 'sexual revolution1 of recent years may have
useful by-products in striking layers of prudery from a subject long
irrationally kept from needed ventilation."^
There was the expected dissent from Douglas.

He felt that the

court was "at large" to make a decision because, "we deal with tastes and
standards of literature.

What shocks me may be sustenance for my neigh

bor.

What causes one person to boil up in rage over one pamphlet or
go
movie may reflect only his neurosis not shared by others. . . .
As is intimated by the Court's opinion, the materials before us
may be garbage. But so is much of what is said in political
campaigns, in the daily press, on TV or over the radio. By rea
son of the First Amendment--and solely because of it--speakers
and publishers have not been threatened or subdued because
their thoughts and ideas may be offensive to some. 9
With this, the present discussion of pornography is finished.
controversy is, however, still very much alive.

The

The Court in its major

ity opinions has held this form of expression to be prohibited (with the
exception of the privacy of one's own home).

The dissenters, most

notably Douglas and Brennan, have argued for acceptance and protection
subject only to the test of a threat of imminent action (Douglas) of
the exposure to non-consenting adults or juveniles (Brennan).

These

arguments will be discussed further in a later chapter.
Marriage and Procreation
This general category, like pornography, is a delicate one.

It

deals with the right to marry who one pleases, the right to control when
a couple will bear children and with the right to terminate a pregnancy.
6?Ibid., 36.
68I b i d . , 40.
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The first cases in this section will be Griswold v. Connecticut and
Eisenstadt, Sheriff v. Baird.7(^
Griswold involved the conviction of the Executive Director of the
Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut and its medical director, a li
censed physician, as accessories for giving married persons information
and medical advise on how to prevent conception and, following examina
tion, prescribing a contraceptive device or material for the wife's use.
The challenged Connecticut statute made it a crime for any person to use
any drug or article to prevent conception.7^
The Court ruled the statute unconstitutional and invoked the Ninth
Amendment to the Constitution which, "protects those liberties that are
so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental."

72

With regard to this amendment Justice Goldberg

stated in a concurring opinion that,
The language and history of the Ninth Amendment reveal that the
Frpmers of the Constitution believed that there are additional
fundamental rights, protected from governmental infringement,
which exist alongside those fundamental rights specifically
mentioned in the first eight constitutional amendments. . . .
To hold that a right so basic and fundamental and so deep
rooted in our society as the right of privacy in marriage may
be infringed because the right is not guaranteed in so many
words by the first eight amendments to the Constitution is to
ignore the Ninth Amendment and give it no effect whatsoever.'3
Regarding this right of marital privacy and the sanctity of the
home, Goldberg appeared to have extended the Brandeis dissent relating7
3
*
1
0
70381 U.S. 479 (1964); 405 U.S. 438 (1971).
71381 U.S. 479 (1964).
72

Ibid., 487.

731bid. 488, 491.
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to telephones and the Stanley v. Georgia decision relating to private
possession of pornography, to the sex life of married persons and the
privacy of the marital bedroom.
Certainly the safeguarding of the house does not follow merely
from the sanctity of property rights. The home derives its
pre-eminance as the seat of family life. And the integrity of
that life is something so fundamental that it has been found to
draw to its protection, the principles of more than one explic
itly granted Constitutional right. . . . Of this whole 'private
realm of family life* it is difficult to imagine what is more
private or more intimate than a husband and wife's marital rela
tions.^^
By the same token, Eisenstadt, Sheriff v. Baird involked a similar
(in fact almost identical) right pertaining to single persons.

A Massa

chusetts statute was challenged which made it a felony for anyone to give
away a drug, medicine, instrument or article for the prevention of con
ception except in the case of a registered physician administering or
prescribing it for a married person or an active registered pharmacist
furnishing it to a married person presenting a registered physician's
prescription.

7C

By way of decision, the Court stated;
It is true that in Griswold the right to privacy in question
inhered in the marital relationship. Yet the married couple
is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own,
but an association of two individuals each with a separate
intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusions
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the de
cision whether to bear or beget a child.
With this case dispatched, the right to use contraceptives has
been expanded to cover the single person as well.
74Ibid., 495.
75405 U.S. 438 (1971).
761bid., 453.

The import of this7
6
5
4
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is that the individual is free to use what devices he or she wishes to
prevent conception.

A right of privacy has been invoked stipulating

that when a woman becomes pregnant it is to be at her discretion as to
when and even with whom.

This is a right of privacy which essentially

translates into the right to choose when and in what circumstances a
child will be conceived.

This now becomes a freedom of choice issue.

A somewhat similar case (although not dealing with contraceptives)
was Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur.777
0 In this case, pregnant
9
8
school teachers brought suit challenging the constitutionality of manda
tory maternity leaves.

The statute in question required the teacher to

take an unpaid maternity leave for five months before childbirth.

The

teacher was not eligible to return to the class until the next regular
semester after the child was three months old.

There was also a require-

ment of a physician's certificate before the teacher could return.

78

The Supreme Court struck down the section referring to leaving five
months before the due date of birth and the three month old child pro
vision, but retained the section referring to the doctor's certification
of fitness.7^

In its opinion the Court said that, "this Court has long

recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and
family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment."
77414 U.S. 632 (1973).
78Ibid., 632.
791bid., 647, 649.
80Ibid. , 639.
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This decision served to solidify the previous claim in the Con
traception Cases of a freedom of choice in the marital relation.

It

also strengthened the general claim to freedom of choice.
O]
Skinner v. Oklahoma
played an important role in determining the
three preceeding cases.

In 1935 Oklahoma enacted a new statute known as

the Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act.

As Henry Abraham has noted,

"It was passed by the legislature in a burst of moral enthusiasm, fully
confident not only of its wisdom but of its constitutionality."

82

The

law defined an habitual criminal as one who had been convicted of a
felony amounting to more than $20 three or more times (the third or last
conviction must have been in Oklahoma).

Such an individual, in accordance

with the Act, could be sterilized involuntarily.

The state brought these

sterilization proceedings against Skinner, a convicted armed robber and
chicken thief.8
83
*
1

The Supreme Court ruled that this Act deprived certain

individuals of a right, "which is basic to the perpetuation of a race—
the right to have offspring."

84

Ruling that the Act deprived Skinner of Equal Protection under the
law according to the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court reasoned that,
marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race. The power to sterilize, if exercised,
may have subtle, far reaching and dangerous effects. In evil
or reckless hands it can cause races or types which are inimi
cal to the dominant group to wither and disappear. There is no
81316 U.S. 536 (1941).
op

Henry J. Abraham, Freedom and the Court, 2nd ed. (Oxford Univer
sity Press, 1972), p. 96.
83316 U.S. 536 (1941).
8 4 I b i d . , 536.
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redemption for the individual whom the law touches. Any ex
periment which the State conducts is to his irreparable injury.
He is forever deprived of a basic liberty.85
Not only has the right to procreate (or to not procreate) been de
fended by the Supreme Court on a basis of freedom of choice but the right
to marry has been similarly defended.

The case of Loving v. Virginia8^

set forth such a freedom of choice in marriage.

This case challenged

Virginia statutes making it illegal for persons of different races to
marry.

In it, Virginia’s statutory scheme to prevent marriages between

persons solely on the basis of racial classification was held to violate
both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

87

The trial judge in Virginia suspended the Loving's one year jail
sentence for twenty-five years on the condition that they not return to
gether to Virginia for the period of the suspended sentence.

The judge

argued that,
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay, and
red, and He placed them on separate continents. And but for
the interference with his arrangements there would be no cause
for such marriages. The fact that He separated the races shows
that He did not intend for the races to mix.88
This must have caused some eyebrows to rise at the Supreme Court
for the Virginia Court's decision was overruled.

The Supreme Court

stated that, "the freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of
the vital personal rights essential to the pursuit of happiness by free
on
men."
The Court additionally asserted that,
85Ibid., 541.
86388 U.S. 1 (1966).
87 Ibid., 1.
8 8 1 b id . , 3.

Ibid., 12.
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Marriage is one of the basic civil rights of man, fundamental to
our very existence and survival. To deny this fundamental free
dom on so unsupportable basis as the racial classifications em
bodied in these statutes . . . is surely to deprive all the
state’s citizens of liberty without due process of law. The
Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to
marry not be restricted by invidious racial discrimination.
Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry or not marry, a
person of another race resides with the individual and cannot
be infringed by the state.90
Attention is lastly turned to the controversial and complex issue
of abortion.

The cases of Roe v. Wade and Doe v, Bolton

91

were decided

jointly in 1973 and opened a Pandora's Box of issues that have not as yet
been fully resolved.

The Roe case involved a pregnant woman who brought

a class action suit against the Texas abortion statute.

92

The Doe case

involved a challenge to a Georgia statute requiring consent by a hospital
abortion committee, among other things, by a woman who was denied an
abortion when she was eight weeks pregnant.

In these two cases the

court's decision was broad and far reaching in promoting the cause of
personal privacy.
In the Roe case, the court traced the history of legal abortion.
The court stated that at common law abortion before "quickening" was not
an indictable offense.

Specifically, the Court asserted that "the ab

sence of a common-law crime for prequickening abortion appears to have
developed from a confluence of earlier philosophical, theological, and
civil and canon law concepts of when life begins. . . . "
the Court stated,
90Ibid., 12.
91410 U.S. 113 (1973); 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
92410 U.S. 113.
93

Ibid., 179.
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At common law, at the time of the adoption of our Constitution,
and throughout the major portion of the nineteenth century, abor
tion was viewed the less disfavor than under most American
statutes currently in effect. Phrasing it another way, a woman
enjoyed a substantially broader right to terminate a pregnancy
than she does in most states today. At least with respect to
the early stages of pregnancy, and very possibly without such a
limitation, the opportunity to make this choice was present in
this country well into the nineteenth century.94
In support of the Court, Cyril Means has noted that English and
American women enjoyed a common law liberty from Edward III to George
III to terminate at will an unwanted pregnancy.

This common law liberty

endured in England from 1327 to 1803 and in America from 1603 to the
1820's in every jurisdiction.

American women were in full possession

of this liberty in 1791 when the Bill of Rights was adopted.

When abor

tion was restricted in the 1820's and 1830's by statutes, the restric
tions are based on scientific fact concerning the medical risk to
women's lives during abortion at any stage of gestation.

95

This risk of abortion provided a basis for the Court to argue that
a State's real concern in enacting a criminal abortion law was to pro
tect the pregnant woman, that is, to restrain her from submitting to a
procedure that placed her life in serious jeopardy.

96

With this historical context in mind, the Court turned to justify
ing its stand on abortion.

It invoked what has by now become almost a

familiar friend, the right of privacy.

The Court said that,

Although the results are divided, most . . . courts have agreed
that the right of privacy, however based, is broad enough to
cover the abortion decision; that the right, nonetheless, is not
94Ibid., 132-133.
95

.
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.
Mary F. Berry, Constitutional Aspects of the Right to Limit
Childbearing.(U.S. Civil Rights Commission, 1975), p. 46.
96410 U.S. 149.
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absolute and is subject to some limitations; and that at some
point the state interests as to protection of health, medical
standards and prenatal life, become dominant. ^
The Court, as a matter of fact, believed that harm could come to
a woman by being denied an abortion, asserting that "this right of pri
vacy . . .

is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or

not to terminate her pregnancy.

The detriment that the state would im

pose upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent."

98

These detrimental effects included specific and direct harm

diagnosable in early pregnancy; a distressful life and future for a woman
because of psychological harm to a prospective mother where pregnancy and
more children may affect her mental and physical health, and where there
is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable to
psychologically and otherwise care for it.

Therefore, the majority in

the Roe case, "adopted the view that whether a fetus has life or not is
up to each individual to decide.
The preceding statements tend to indicate that the Court intended
their decision to reflect the free choice view that pregnant women when
faced with the alternative of childbirth or abortion should make up
their own mind (or choose) whether or not, according to their own moral
convictions, to have an abortion.

The Court declined in these cases to

tackle the tricky issue of when human life begins.

They stated that,

We need not measure the difficult question of when life begins.
When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine,
philosophy and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus,
the judiciary at this point in the development of man's knowledge
is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.101
97Ibid., 155.
98Ibid., 153.
99
yaIbid. , 153.
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Also, with reference to the First Amendment, the Court stated that to
prohibit abortion is a constraint on the First Amendment, specifically
the Court said, "when t.he restriction flows from wholly or partially non
secular or religious motives.

When no wholly non-secular reason can be

advanced for the prohibition, then to outlaw abortion is a direct assault
on the freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment."

102

Consequently, abortion was liberalized and justified on the basis
of the right to privacy much in the same way as the right to marry in
Loving or the right to procreate in LaFleur and Skinner. Obviously, if
there is a right to procreate, then there is a right to not procreate
and with the Roe and Doe decisions, the Court, in essence, stated that a
woman has the right to "undo" procreation or, basically, to change her
mind.

Justice Berger in a concurring opinion to Doe gave the unqualified

assurance that, "plainly, the Court rejects any claim that the Constitution requires abortion on demand."

The Court took steps to insure at

least a nominal amount of deliberation by advocating that the decision
to terminate a pregnancy was between the patient and her physician.^ 4
In addition, the Court, perhaps in a stroke of wisdom, perhaps by way of
compromise, broke the gestation period and correlative right to abortion
into trimesters, each with different qualifications and criteria.
Court said,
For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first tri
mester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left
to the medical judgment of the woman's attending physician.
10?

Berry, Constitutional Aspects, 27.

103410 U.S. 208.
104 Ibid., 163.
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In the second trimester, states may regulate abortions in ways
reasonably related to maternal health. . . . In the third tri
mester the state in promoting its interest in the potentiality
of human life, may regulate and even prohibit abortion except
where necessary for the preservation of the life or health of
the mother.105
It is in this third trimester where "the point of compelling state
interest" occurs.

Here the state has a stake in preserving the life

that would potentially survive outside the uterus.
With abortion, contraception, marriage, trials, voting, education,
religion and others, the Supreme Court indicates a broad range of ac
tivities where choice is indicated as a resolution to a legal contro
versy.

With these decisions the Court is making one of several possible

statements.
on an issue.

It may be "passing the buck" and not taking a definite side
The Court may be saying that people may choose but only

in those areas where choice cannot be prevented, such as voting.

Al

ternately, the Court may be indicating that people must have alternatives
so that individuals may rightfully engage in those pursuits where govern
ment has no business interfering.
In any case, it is essential that this discussion of choice deter
mine what the Court means when it uses the words "choose" or "choice."
There is no guarantee that the Court has been consistent.

Through its

history, many jurists have been members of the Supreme Court.
could have had a different conception of the term "choice."

Each
It is es

sential to try to discern a pattern in order to see if the Court has
arrived at a consensus with regard to choice.

This will be dealt with in

the following chapter using the Court's statements in conjunction with
the models developed and identified in the preceding chapter.
105

Ibid., 114.
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The Court may be doing one of several things with the concept of
choice.

For example, the Court may be advocating that with choice all

that is necessary is for an individual to act in some fashion.

Alter

natively it may be indicating that an individual must contemplate
possible options in a deliberative fashion before acting.

Finally, the

Court may simply be guaranteeing the existence of alternatives while
leaving the manner of narrowing alternatives to the final action to the
individual.

The following chapter will determine which, if any, of

these conceptual approaches has been adopted by the Court.
In any event, the Court, through its decisional history, has been
seen in this chapter, to allow a great amount of latitude in multiple
areas of human endeavor.
means all inclusive.

The areas which were discussed are by no

These areas are, however, a broad range of activi

ties many of which are controversial, hotly debated and highly personal
issues.

Being as such, these issues may be construed subject only to

individual preference, not majority rule.

Precisely, what has been

indicated by the Court with regard to choice or freedom of choice is not
yet clear.

The next chapter will attempt to clarify these points and

present the Court's theory of choosing which, though not consciously de
veloped by the Court, exists by extrapolation of various statements
about the concept of choice in relation to the individual and society.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS AND ANALYSIS
Penumbra
Before relating the opinions of the Court with the theories of
freedom of choice, it is necessary to combine the statements of the vari
ous justices in order to ascertain their stances relative to the concept
of choice.

There is no one Constitutional Amendment with which freedom

of choice can be identified.
of them together.

It is necessary, therefore, to view several

In Griswold v. Connecticut^ particularly, and in

several other cases as well, various amendments were invoked which were
construed as protecting the right of privacy in marriage (e.g., to marry,
the decision whether to bear or beget a child) which most certainly en
tailed a right to choose.

The protection afforded to this right of pri

vacy was construed to be under the "penumbra" of the Constitution.

In

Griswold, Justice Douglas reviewed several court cases which to him es
tablished "that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance."^

These were considered by Douglas to encompass areas not

specifically mentioned in the Bill of Rights.

As Abraham noted,

He [Douglas] thereupon cited five different amendments the 'pen
umbras' of which 'create zones of privacy,' among them the First
Amendment's protection of the right of association, the Third's
prohibition of quartering of soldiers in homes, the Fourth's
1381 U.S. 479 (1964).
2Ibid., 484.
68
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guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Fifth's
against compulsory self-incrimination. He added, in a coup of
possibly interpretive trail-blazing, the Ninth Amendment, jus
tifying its inclusion as a beacon to illuminate 'the zone of pri
vacy created by the several fundamental constitutional guaran
tees .' 3
In this case, as has been shown, an umbrella or penumbra effect of
the Constitution was identified which may be construed as offering pro
tection to a specific right of privacy.

This right of privacy has previ

ously been shown to have an intrinsic relation to freedom of choice
through several cases where the two have been mentioned almost in the
same breath.

Specifically, the Court stated in Roe v. Wade, that "free

dom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of
the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend4
ment."
This not only indicates a relationship between the right of pri
vacy and freedom of choice, but pulls the Fourteenth Amendment into the
penumbra as well.
The remainder of this section will attempt to draw some of the
statements from the previous cases into the framework of the Constitution
as well as its penumbra, and delineate the concept of choosing as it
appears in these statements.

The primary exception will be pornography,

which will be discussed separately, for while upholding elements of
choosing, the Court has maintained a proscription.
In the case of West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, the
Court upheld a right to be different.
O

The decision stated that "we apply

Henry J. Abraham, Freedom and the Court, 2nd ed., (Oxford Univer
sity Press, 1972), p. 72.
4410 U.S. 169 (1973).
5319 U.S. 624 (1942).
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the limitations of the Constitution with no fear that freedom to be in
tellectually and spiritually diverse or even contrary will disintegrate
the social o r g a n i z a t i o n . The Court held that patriotic ceremonies in
school would and ought to be "voluntary and spontaneous instead of a com
pulsory routine. . . .

This freedom to differ is a matter of choice,

particularly in light of the statement that such ceremonies are to be vol
untary.

It was further stated by the Court in Barnette that the "right

of freedom of thought and of religion as guaranteed by the Constitution
against State action includes both the right to speak freely and the
g
right to refrain from speaking at all."
This is an obvious reference
to and an invoking of the First Amendment. In the earlier case of Cart9
well v. Connecticut this First Amendment right, described in Barnette,
v/as further asserted by the Court in that,
Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious
organization or form of worship as the individual may choose
cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards
the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus the
Amendment embraces two concepts— freedom to believe and free
dom to act.10
The Court appears to be asserting here that the First Amendment is suppor
tive of freedom of choice.
On these grounds, the First Amendment does not stand alone.

The

Fourteenth Amendment is seen to be a protector of the right to choose,
further strengthening this penumbra concept.
6Ibid., 641.
7 Ibid., 641.
8 Ibid., 645.
9310 U.S. 303 (1936).
10 Ibid., 303-304.

In Beilan v. Board of Public
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Education^

Justice Douglas wrote in dissent that the liberties of the

First Amendment are guaranteed to the citizens by the Fourteenth Amend
ment.

The liberties include,

. . . the right to believe what one chooses, the right to dif
fer from his neighbors, the right to pick and choose the politi
cal philosophy that he likes best, the right to associate with
whomever he chooses, the right to join the groups he prefers,
the privilege of selecting his own path to salvation.'2
The Fourth Amendment comes into play as well.

In his oft quoted

and famous dissent in Olmstead v. U.S., which has been seen to hold the
impact of law many times since it was written, Justice Brandeis stated
that the makers of the Constitution.
. . . [Sjought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred,
as against the Government, the right to be let alone. . . . To
protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the
Government upon the privacy of the individual . . . must be
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
To conclude this section, attention must be returned to the Gris
wold case.
Connecticut.

This case dealt with the availability of contraceptives in
The Court held that individuals have the right to choose

v/hen or even whether or not to bear or beget a child and to take precau
tions against conception.

In so ruling the Court stated that,

The entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that
clearly underlie its specific guarantees demonstrate that the
rights to marital privacy and to marry and raise a family are
of similar order and magnitude as the fundamental rights spec
ifically protectedJ5
With regard to this, the Court stated, by way of invoking the protection
of the Constitution, that the Ninth Amendment

"simply lends strong sup

port to the view that the liberty protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth
12Ibid., 412.

l4Ibid., 478.

13277 U.S. 438 (1928).

15381 U.S. 495 (1964).
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Amendments from infringement by the Federal Government or by the States
is not restricted to rights specifically mentioned in the first eight
amendments.
It has been shown, then, that with respect to the Constitution,
the Court has upheld a right to privacy, a right to be different and
other rights with specific relation to the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth,
Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.

This sort of sweep

ing coverage gives Constitutional guarantees to choice under its penumbra
At closer inspection, the Court is allowing various spheres of behavior
or action which are open to personal expressions of selection, preference--or more precisely--choice.
of choice is established.

In this context Constitutional freedom

A more precise statement of the Court's posi

tion on this freedom will be formulated later in this chapter with re
gard to the various models and philosophies.

Prior to this, pornography

will again be discussed for there continues to be a judicial controversy
in this area of human activity.

Some jurists argue for pornography1s

prohibition while others claim protection and even choice.
More Pornography
The reasoning of the Court with respect to the prohibition of
pornography was that not all utterances were protected at the inception
of the Bill of Rights and hence the First Amendment was not intended to
protect all speech and expression.

As Roth v. U.S. illustrated,

The guarantees of freedom of expression in effect in ten of
the fourteen states which by 1792 had ratified the Constitu
tion, gave no absolute protection for every utterance. Thir
teen of the fourteen States provided for prosecution of libel,
16

Ibid., 493.
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and all of those States made either blasphemy or profanity, or
both statutory crimes. . . . In light of this history, it is ap
parent that the unconditional phrasing of the First Amendment was
not intended to protect every utteranceJ7
This same line of argument was also used in the later case of Miller v.
California.

In it, the Court asserted,

The protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of politi
cal and social change desired by the people. . . . But the pub
lic portrayal of hardcore sexual conduct for its own sake, and
for the ensuing commercial gain, is a different matter. . . .
To equate the free and robust exchange of ideas and political
debate with commercial exploitation of obscene material demeans
the grand conception of the First Amendment and its high pur
pose in the historic struggle for freedomJS
With regard to these arguments, the Court in the Paris Theatre case
ruled that,
The States have the power to make
that public exhibition of obscene
material has a tendency to injure
endanger the public safety, or to
to maintain a decent society.

a morally neutral judgment
material, or commerce in such
the community as a whole, to
jeopardize the state's right

What this indicated is that the Court did not believe that all speech is
protected (contrary to what Mr. Douglas would say) and that the State has
a right to at least regulate public and commercial exhibition of porn
ography.

Whether this is contrary to any conception of a freedom of

choice remains to be seen.

The Court has upheld the right, in Stanley v.

Georgia , of private possession and use of pornography.

The Court has

specified "public" in its prohibition of pornography and has upheld that
conviction.
Theatre
17

It might be remembered that the major issue in the Paris

case was whether or not a theater was a "place of public1
8
7
354 U.S. 482-483 (1957).

18413 U.S. 34 (1972).
191bid., 68 (1972).
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accomodation."

Judged so to be, the activity of showing pornographic

movies was prohibited.
At issue remains the current status of pornography with regard to
the Constitution.

Henry Abraham maintains that the 1970's have shown

that "de minimus, three aspects of the obscenity puzzle are now res
judicata.

These aspects are basically the same as those found in the
OI
Redrup Group.
Rule 1 noted that in none of the three cases did the

challenged statute reflect a specific and limited state concern for ju
veniles.

Rule 2 explained that in none of the cases was there any effort

of pandering.

Rule 3 pointed out that none of the materials in question
op
23
was forced on an unwilling public.
It was the case of Ginzburg v. U.S.
which introduced the concept of pandering.

Ginzburg was convicted of

obscenity not because of the material he published but because of the
manner by which it was advertised.

With regard to the advertisements,

the Court ruled,
When an exploitation of interests in titillation by pornography
is shown with respect to material lending itself to such ex
ploitation through pervasive treatment or description of sexual
matter, such evidence may support the determination that the
material is obscene even though in other contexts the material
would escape such condemnation.25*
5
3
2
on

Abraham, Freedom and the Court, 188.

^Redrup v. New York; Gent v. Arkansas; Austin v. Kentucky, 386
U.S. 767 (1966).
^Abraham, Freedom and the Court, 185.
23383 U.S. 463 (1965).
^Abraham, Freedom and the Court, 184.

25 383 U.S. 475 (1965).
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In this sense, an additional criteria has been included with the
unwilling public doctrine of Roth v. U.S. which has been previously dis
cussed and of exposure to juveniles advocated in the dissent of the
Paris Theater case and specifically upheld in Ginsberg v. New York.

In

Ginsberg it was stated that New York could indeed make it a crime to
knowingly sell "to minors under seventeen years of age material defined
to be obscene to them whether or not it would be obscene to adults."
What is left, by way of current status, are three rules slightly
different and more specific than the Redrup Rules.

These are (1) that

just about everything "goes" in the privacy of one's own home, and that
what goes on there is beyond the reach of government (Stanley v. Georgia),
(2) that public "hard-core" pornography is not constitutionally protected
(Roth v. U.S.), and (3) that there now exists a judicially sanctioned
double-standard vis-a-vis obscenity legislation directed at minors and
adults (Ginsberg v. New York).

27

These are the rules.

There have been

those, particularly Douglas and Brennan, who have argued for complete
protection of pornography.

Within the limits of the just described

rules, however, lies a certain amount of latitude.

It is reasonable to

protect unwilling recipients from advertisements as in Miller v. Cali
fornia.

It is also reasonable to protect minors.

These can be justi

fied using the same compelling state interest test as used in the abor
tion decisions relating to proscription in the third tri-mester in order
to protect the potential life.
Justice Douglas stated that our society "presupposes that freedom
and liberty are in a frame of reference that makes the individual, not2
*
6
26390 U.S. 629 (1967).
07

Abraham, Freedom and the Court, p. 188.

76

government, the keeper of his tastes, beliefs and ideas."

OO

That is a

noble sentiment, but by the same token, an individual who does not wish
to be exposed to sexually oriented material, either through the mail
or on the newsstand, ought to have his right protected as well.

Brennan

even stated that exposure of minors and non-consenting adults to pornography contained all the elements of assault.

29

In this sense, then, some of these decisions may be wise in their
protection of the rights of others.
ception ought to be taken.

The Paris Theater case is where ex

This case first defined a theater as a place

of public accomodation and then prohibited the showing of pornographic
movies.

This was done even with the admission that certain precautions

warning minors and non-consenting adults were taken.

With regard to

this notion Abraham stated;
The adult public, of course, should be free to patronize or re
fuse to patronize the visual as well as the written media without
governmental interference, or injunction by administrative or
legislative fiat, or the censorial tactics of a powerful or
vocal pressure group. If a movie is offensive to the sensi
bilities of a minority or majority group, that group is entirely
free to advise and campaign against its patronization. But it
is emphatically not free to prevent those who desire to patron
ize it from so doing. Freedom of expression is a two-edged
sword. So is democracy.30
What is left is that one may read or view what one desires in the
privacy of a home.

A bookstore proprietor can sell most materials as

long as access to juveniles is restricted and non-consenting adults are
not needlessly exposed.

The problem again is with the theater.

With re

gard to the Paris Theatre case, a more appropriate line of reasoning might*
9
2
OO

413 U.S. 73 (1972).
29

Ibid., 108.

3D
Abraham, Freedom and the Court, p. 189.
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have been that since the advertisements were not pandered and there were
some precautions taken against minors and non-consenting adults, then
the theater should have been allowed to show the movies.
definition of a public place need not have been abrogated.

The civil rights
There was

nothing said about the color or creed or even gender of the patron, only
about the age and acquiescence of the patron.
chase a ticket.

One is not forced to pur

The purchase of a ticket is the tacit acceptance to the

implied conditions of consent and age.

It may quite probably be that

more strides in this area could be made allowing an additional amount of
freedom ther than following the restrictive reasoning employed and imposed
by the Paris Theatre decision.
Towards Constitutional Freedom of Choice
It becomes apparent, then that the issue of pornography is not as
big or drastic a blow to freedom of choice as was first indicated.
Court's reasoning is based on a compelling state interest

The

based on pro

tection of those to whom exposure might be offensive and those who are of
an age where restrictions on choice may legitimately be placed.
The issue of freedom of choice remains unresolved, however.

It

has been shown that the Supreme Court protects a freedom called choice,
but it is as yet unclear as to the Court's meaning and conception

of

the term and the term's application to their decisions.
Earlier discussion in this paper was directed at definitions and
models of choice.

Several elements of a choice were discussed with cer

tain areas of general agreement.

One of these was alternatives.

In all

the cases discussed it becomes clear that the Court has been involved
with sanctioning, prohibiting or placing some form of restriction on

78

particular actions.

As mentioned in Chapter II, alternatives are the

existence of two or more courses of action which are possible or at least
believed possible to perform.

By example, it can be shown that the de

cisional history of the Court discussed in Chapter III not only contain
ed certain guarantees of freedom of choice but alternatives as well.
Adams v. McCann and Faretta v. California defended the right to
waive counsel in a criminal proceeding.

It is an equally possible al

ternative to obtain and rely upon legal counsel.

Pierce v. Society of

Sisters and Wisconsin v. Yoder guaranteed the alternative of the type of
education which parents may provide for their children.

Griswold v.

Connecticut and Eisenstadt, Sheriff v. Baird guaranteed the right of indi
viduals to use or not use contraceptive devices and in cases such as
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur and Skinner v. Oklahoma the right
to bear or beget or not to bear or beget a child.

Loving v. Virginia^

protected the right to marry the person of one's choice and Roe v. Wade
and Doe v. Bolton gave the alternative of abortion to childbirth.

These

and other cases indicate that first and foremost the Court guarantees
possible courses of actions, or more properly alternatives.
With alternatives noted, it is necessary to turn to another element
which has stirred controversy and debate with regard to choosing.

This

element is deliberation and lies at the crux of the theory of freedom
of choice, for to some authors deliberation determines the choice while
to others deliberation is not even included, as choice is equated only
with the particular action taken.

This concept has been discussed by

virtually all the authors included in Chapter II and has yet to be re
solved.

It, therefore, becomes necessary to attempt to resolve this

issue within this paper.
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Some of the authors have said that deliberation isthe conscious
consideration of the relative merits of available alternatives.

To them,

unless one says to himself, "on the one hand is this . . . , and on the
other hand is this. . . ." then there can be no deliberation and conse
quently no choice.

Others such as Campbell say that character is the mo-1

tivating force behind the majority of choices and that we merely act ac
cording to the dictates of our character as formed within the realm of
our experience, personality or even heredity.

Still others believe that

there is no deliberation, only acting on alternatives or "doing-thisrather-than-that."
But the question remains--what is deliberation?

Is not taking the

path of least resistance indicative of some form of deliberation?
knows the process of the human mind?

Who

It is not absolutely necessary

to consciously weigh merits of alternatives to say that one has deliber
ated.

It may indeed be possible to deliberate without ever being con

scious of the deliberation.

When action follows almost immediately on

the heels of encountering alternatives, there may still have been de
liberation.

A mental "flash" may dictate the course of action.

But,

who is to say that this mental "flash" was not deliberation of some
sort?
low.

This "flash" allowed the individual to know which course to fol
It perhaps emanated from his "character," but the elements or na

ture of the alternatives had to be mentally "processed" before action
was initiated.

By "processed" is meant cognizance of the nature of the

alternatives and their elements.

Once processed, something "clicks"

and action is taken.
When a bowl of fruit is encountered containing apples and oranges,
some would say that the physical act of taking an apple constitutes a
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choice without resorting to deliberating.
mentally.

Again, something "clicks"

Perhaps the tart, crisp taste of an orange comes to the mouth,

the hand reaches out and takes an orange.
tion theory say, "A hah!

Those subscribing to the ac

an orange was taken, he has chosen!"

choice occurred at the point of the "taste."
native which was preferred.

The

The orange became the alter

An unexplained mental activity caused the

mouth to "taste" the orange and desire it.

This could be called a form

of deliberation, although it is not conscious.
the individual to desire an orange.
way he felt that day or moment.

Something internal caused

Perhaps experience, or perhaps the

Conscious deliberation did not occur,

but who is to say that this inner craving and mental activity was not
some form of deliberation?
Or, taking the same bowl of fruit, if the individual sees apples
and oranges he may suddenly gain a mental image of the last apple he
ate.

This particular apple was soft and squishy and it had a worm in it.

So he takes an orange.

Again, the action theorist says that by the act

of taking an orange an individual has chosen.
the choice synonomous with the taking?

Did he deliberate?

Whatever the mental activity,

whether it is deliberation or a "flashback," something intervened.
did not just act.
of mental process.

Was

He

Something caused him to take that orange, some sort
The recollection of a negative experience caused him

to choose/act in a particular way.

It shows that there is something be

tween the alternative phase and the action phase.
to verbalize the choice.

It may be internal.

It is not necessary

There is, however, some

thing which distinguishes choosing from mere taking.

That is an acknow

ledgement of some sort of Dreference either privately or out loud; a com
mitment.

This is based upon some sort of mental activity, either delib

eration or as Campbell would say, "according to his character."
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The preceding arguments indicate that the model of choice pre
sented by Evans and Taylor needs some revision.

These two authors made

a tautological statement by saying that choosing is acting.

The pre

ceding examples contradict their definition and make its value and ap
plication to this study questionable.

The examples given are virtually

analogous to those used by Taylor in Chapter II.

This indicated that

some form of activity preceeds the taking and that choosing can not be
regarded as identical with taking as expounded by Evans.

Obviously,

as Evans stated, choosing cannot initiate action and neither can delib
eration, but choosing cannot be understood in terms of mere doing.

The

conclusion must be that there is a process involved which includes the
awareness of alternatives, some sort of mental process or deliberation,
a choice or commitment to an alternative and action on that choice.
Evans argued that the choice should initiate the action.

This is not^

necessary because the individual considers (consciously or unconsciously)
the alternatives, he then chooses and finally initiates the action.

To

say that the choice initiates action is to say that the inmates run the
asylum.

So, it has become apparent that choosing is not and cannot be

the same as acting.

That a choice has been made may be discernible only

through the action taken is conceded, but the mistake should not be
made that this action is the same as the choice.

Acting, taking and doing

are part of choosing, but they are not choosing for to choose must in
clude the elements previously listed.
Even P. H. Nowell-Smith in the second model maintained that the
root idea of choosing is the physical act of taking or doing something.
He also said that with regard to choosing actions, that choosing is de
ciding.

For Nowell-Smith deliberating, deciding and intending all
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cluster around doing, but the doing is the end result of this process.
Doing may be the objective but it is not the sole criteria.

Nowell -

Smith's final definition of choosing is doing-this-rather-than-that.

To

solely define choosing in this fashion is to eliminate the important
and essential elements of knowing what alternatives are available, con
sidering or deliberating (or some other mental activity), and a commit
ment or actual choice.

Physical taking or acting is and must be pre-

ceeded by this process.

Therefore, Nowell-Smith's model will not do

either.
The third model is that choosing is the same as deciding and is in
fact the product of a process of deliberation.

It has already been es

tablished that at least some sort of mental activity intervenes between
the awareness of alternatives and the actual choosing.

This activity

may be conscious weighing of salient attributes or may even be an in
stantaneous commitment based on inspiration, experience, environment,
psychology, genetics or perhaps more appropriately, Campbell's "charac
ter."

Devaney believed that choice involves conscious acceptance and

rejection and no simple physical movement is equivalent to this.

He

believed that action itself cannot take the place of the agent's judging
that this or some other alternative was the best in a given set of cir
cumstances.

Along with this, Glasgow maintained that to call something

a choice, there must be an awareness of alternatives as alternatives, to
gether with a considering of these alternatives.

To Glasgow the es

sence of choosing is the commitment to act, not the acting itself.
It appears as if this third model is the one which must be adopted
by the Court.

The Court has made few statements regarding the consider

ing of alternatives.

It has on occasion, however, intimated as to the
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presence of deliberation in a context of free choice.

These intimations

of the Court follow the view taken by W. D. Glasgow that in choosing
there must be at least minimal amount of deliberation or considering of
Ol
alternatives.
With regard to this, the Court has made several statements
which imply a deliberative process of choosing.
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court noted the right of the
child to influence the parent's choice of a public or parochial education.
If a choice may be influenced by the desire or actions of a child, then
there must be a presumption of some sort of thought process, considera
tion and even deliberation involved in the particular choice made by the
parent.
Although in dissent, Justice Douglas stated in Roth v. U.S. that
with regard to the First Amendment, he had the same confidence in the
ability of the people "to reject noxious literature as in their capaci.ty
to sort out the true from the false in theology, economics, politics or
any other field."

The key expression employed here is "sort-out."

To "sort-out," as Douglas appears to have meant it, is to categorize,
classify, or to process in some way the true from the false.

Most ob

viously, this is indicative of some form of mental activity prior to
embracing that which is considered to be true.

This follows from Doug

las's conviction expressed in Pollack v. Board of Public Utilities that
people have the right to pick and choose among competing entertainments,
political philosophies, or propagandas.3
1
31W. D. Glasgow, "The Concept of Choosing," Analysis, 38 (1960)
p. 65.
32

354 U.S. 514 (1956).
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In Adams v. U.S. ex rel McCann, the Court indicated a right to choose
to waive a trial by jury.

The right to choose was exercised as stated in

Chapter III, when the waiver was taken with the defendent's express, in
telligent consent.

In other words, the defendant must positively waive

the right to a jury after being appraised of the ramifications of his
choice.

In this situation, the Court did not demand that the defendant

deliberate upon his choice and its potential consequences, but did allude
to the necessity of the defendant's being capable of making an intelli
gent choice in this regard.

The element of deliberation is, however,

again evident.
In the Doe v. Bolton decision, the judgment of the attending physici
an was considered by the Court to be the determining factor in first
tri-mester abortions.

In other words, in consultation with the patient,

the doctor will render a medical opinion concerning abortion.

The physici

an hopefully does this by employing his experience and considering the
particular needs and desires of his patient.

The purpose of the consul

tation for the physician is to determine the patient's wishes and posi
tion as to an abortion and to assist the patient in determining whether
an abortion is the best alternative.

The action theorist would not say

a choice has been made until the actual abortion procedure has begun or
been completed.

It is a fair assumption to state that an abortion was

chosen prior to this point, however,

Of course, by the statement "the

judgment of the physician," the Court is not considering deliberation on
the part of the patient as essential.

Justice Berger stated unequivo-

cably in Doe v. Bolton that the Court was nojt.sanctioning abortion on de
mand.

The doctor may refuse and the patient may consult another doctor.

Here the responsibility seems pointed at the physician to counsel,
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deliberate, render judgment, and even try to convince the patient against
an abortion.

But, even though deliberation was considered the physician's

responsibility and not the patient's, deliberation was still considered
a necessary condition for an abortion.
Deliberation within the framework of choice is established, in the
preceeding examples, or as was earlier put by W. D. Glasgow, alternatives
are considered.

In Adams v. U.S. ex rel McCann the Court stated that a

defendant may waive his right to counsel if "he knows what he is doing and
OO
his choice is made with eyes open."
Most assuredly, if one knows what
he is doing it can be assumed that the defendant engaged in at least
some sort of mental process and probably some form of deliberation.
Another important consideration in this deliberative model of choice is
that choosing involves a decision in every case.

To Glasgow a decision

emphasizes a commitment and necessitates deliberation.

He expressed this

when he commented that, "Choice must indeed involve decision, for de
liberation, which we have shown to be essential to choice, if it leads
to action must have a resolution."

34

What importance, then, does the Court place upon the idea of choos
ing as a decision to do or act?

After maintaining that freedom of

choice is involved in the decision to have an abortion performed, the
Court in Roe v. Wade further asserted that the "right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision. . . ."

35

Also, in Doe v. Bolton,

it was stated that among the rights protected under the Ninth Amendment,3
*
33317 U.S. 279 (1942).
•^Glasgow, "Concept of Choosing," p. 65.
35410 U.S. 154 (1973).
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"is freedom of choice in the basic decisions of one's life respecting
marriage, divorce, procreation, contraception, and the education and upbringing of children."

With regard to deciding, Eisenstadt, Sheriff v.

Baird stated that "Our system of government requires that we have faith in
the ability of the individual to decide wisely, if only he is fully
appraised of the merits of a controversy."

Also in this case, as was

quoted in Chapter III, the Court made it clear that within the right of
privacy the individual ought to be free form governmental intrusion into,
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision to bear or
OO
beget a child.
Finally, in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,
the Court recognized freedom of choice in matters of marriage and family
life and also stated that "by acting to penalize pregnant teachers for
deciding to bear a child, overly restrictive maternity leave regula
tions can constitute a heavy burden on the exercise of these protected
freedoms. "3^

It must be noted that all of these cases are from the

1970's , showing that at least the current definition of freedom of
choice by the Court includes the element of decision.
According to Glasgow's conception of choice, decision emphasizes
a commitment.
case.

He also insists that choice involves decision in every

Choosing seems for Glasgow to be logically connected with doing

or taking.

40

Taking this definition as a base, the Court appears to be3
9
8
7
6

361bi d ., 211.
37405 U.S. 459,(1971).
38Ibid., 453.
39414 U.S. 638-640 (1973).
^Glasgow, "Concept of Choosing," p. 65.
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saying that to be free to choose is first to have alternatives; secondly,
to consider those alternatives (deliberate); and thirdly, to make a com
mitment to pursue or act upon one of the alternatives (decide).

This

outline of choice would appear to be entirely consistent with the manner
in which the decisions of the Court have been presented and with the de
velopment of its reasoning.

So once again, according to Glasgow, choice

is understood not as doing-this-rather-than-that but in deciding-to-dothis-rather-than-that.
Although this is what the Court appears to mean by freedom of
choice, the question remains as to how the Court can guarantee freedom
of choice.

It seems quite impossible for the Court to insist upon delib

eration in regards to freedom of choice.

It is necessary, therefore, to

return to the one element that is seen, by reflection, to be in common
with all the cases analyzed in this paper.

That element is alternatives.

In the cases included in Chapter III, the Court was seen as guaranteeing
various courses of action.

Some of these actions are logical (the right

to marry whomever one wishes), others sometimes run against the grain
(elimination of classroom prayers), but all involve alternatives.
J. G. Clapp wrote that ". . . to the number of alternatives which exist,
our freedom extends and no further, for they set the limits of our
choices."41

Similarly, R. C. Skinner noted that "the most important con

dition for making a choice is the possession of freedom of action.

A

person has freedom of action if, in a particular situation, there are two
or more alternative

courses of action which he is able to follow."

42

^J.G. Clapp, "On Freedom," The Journal of Philosophy, 40, No. 4
(Feb. 18, 1943), p. 89.
42
R. C. Skinner, "Freedom of Choice," Mind, 72, No. 288 (1963)
p. 464.
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What then, does all this mean?

The existence of freedom of choice

depends upon the existence of alternatives (without alternatives there
is nothing to choose) which has been defined as freedom of action.

As

Skinner stated in his summation, "the only belief that is essential for
the existence of freedom of choice is the firm, and correct, belief
that in a particular situation there are two or more alternative courses
of action that one is able to follow."

43

The root idea of freedom of choice becomes the existence and guar
antee of alternatives.

This is all the Court can do.

It cannot require

individuals to deliberate, for deliberation would be not only ludicrous
but impossible to enforce.

The expectation and hope is that individuals

in possession of various alternatives will consider what to do and weigh
the relative merits of the alternatives before making and pursuing a
commitment to a course of action.
What is left is that freedom of choice not only exists in the argu
ments of philosophers but in the Supreme Court's understanding of the
United States Constitution.

Perhaps, as asserted by some of the writers

in Chapter II, freedom of choice is not just a freedom guaranteed under
the penumbra of the Constitution.

Perhaps this penumbra effect of

choice is the definition of freedom.

More likely, as believed by J. G.

Clapp, the existence and protection of alternatives allows men to
choose.

With alternatives, men are free.

To deliberate and act accord

ing to that deliberation, in the sense of choice employed by the Court,
is to be more free, "but not as free as the man who deliberates well."^
43

Ibid., 480.

^Clapp, "On Freedom," p. 94.
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What is important is that men can choose and be secure in their choices
from governmental intrusion.
Freedom of choice may more aptly be described as a process in
volving the existence of possible alternatives, a consideration of those
alternatives, commitment to one of them, and finally pursuing the action
involved.

What the Court has done by defending the right to freedom of

choice in numerous decisions is to guarantee that alternatives exist
and that this process is possible.
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